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The meaning and substance behind the label Filipino is questioned, both in 
validity and existence. Using the methods proposed by Michel Foucault on analyzing 
history, this research seeks to answer the question, “What is a Filipino?” To further 
streamline the question – I would like to explore the idea on “How identities are 
constructed.”  
Foucault explores the question of the subject by studying and analyzing the 
approaches taken by western philosophy from the ancient Greek times to the present; 
and in the process, he brings something new to our understanding of the self. His 
philosophy has an intriguing but emancipating set of theories that can enlighten us with 
the problem of identity. This research is not focus on historical data; rather the research 
will explore Michel Foucault‟s ideas on how identity is formed. It explores what Michel 
Foucault calls 'subjectification', the dialectial process of self-making and being-made, 
within the context of ethnic identities and history.  
Filipino-ness or the identity of the Filipino are conventionally associated with the 
rhetoric of traditional politicians, nationalists and academics. The rhetoric on Filipino-
ness assumes the existence of an essential Filipino belonging to a homogenous Filipino 
community, belonging to one Filipino nation. My alternative is Filipino-ness is a product 
of culture and concepts like identity are functional categories rather than ontological 
categories. 
I looked at the history of Philippine cultural practices as a way of establishing a 
Filipino identity. Philippine culture has always been a dynamic site for the dissemination 
of oppositional discourses against these hegemonic notions of Filipino identity. It would 
seem therefore that Philippine culture could serve as calculus of the diversity of Filipinos 
and Filipino communities. For Foucault, people do not have a 'real' identity within 
themselves; that's just a way of talking about the self -- a discourse. Foucault describes 
technologies of the self as the way in which individuals work their way into discourse. 
This is how Filipino-ness can be/was established.  
Although Spain engendered the experiences that defined the indios (a term used 
by Spaniards referring to the local inhabitants of the Philippine islands), it was the 
natives themselves who created the movement that turned the indio into the Filipino. 
Their pre-colonial culture served as a womb for the formation of what would become the 
Filipino culture. Native reactions to the alien intrusions included imitation, adoption, 
indigenization, assimilation, adaptation, and transformation. This process of merging 
diverse cultural elements favors the mother culture, which in this case was the Philippine 
native‟s culture. Practices are what people live by. Shared and common identities give 
way to shifting and localized identities. Identity therefore is not clearly and 
unambiguously defined, rather it shifts over time and is generally considered unstable.  
The Filipino people through cultural practices and everyday living have 
continuously “fashioned” themselves by integrating the fragments of their post-colonial 
past with colonial norms and dictates. The research concludes that a fragmented, un-












The Problem of Filipino Identity: Searching in a Postmodern Space 
 
The Goal of my work during the last twenty years has not been 
to analyze the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the 
foundations of such an analysis. My objective instead, has 
been to create a history of the different modes by which in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects – Michel Foucault1 
 
Background of the Study and Statement of the Problem 
 The move of the Philippine academic circle in the 1970‟s to establish a 
systematized body of Filipino philosophy has led to the realization of the problem of 
Filipino identity. Filipino philosophy remains to be unearthed because the meanings and 
substance behind the label Filipino is questioned, both in its validity and existence. Using 
the methods proposed by Michel Foucault in analyzing history, this research seeks to 
answer the question, “What is a Filipino?” 
 What might be interesting with this study is that it tries to offer an answer on the 
problem of the subject using postmodern tools. Postmodernists seem to agree that the 
grammars of unity, totality, identity, sameness and consensus find little employment in 
postmodern thinking. Jean-Francois Lyotard, arguably the main voice of the 
postmodernists, makes it quite clear when he announces in his postmodern manifesto 
that “consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games” and that we 
need to tolerate the incommensurable, “wage a war on totality,” and “activate the 
differences”2 The Postmodern thought has therefore made heterogeneity, multiplicity, 
diversity, difference, incommensurability dissensus as chief interpretative categories. 
 The consequence of this position for an understanding of the self or the human 
subject is considerable. Questions about the self and particularly questions about the self 
as subject is deemed an anathema. Questions about self-identity, the unity of 
consciousness, and centralized and goal-directed activity have been displaced in the 
                                                 
1
 Rabinow, Paul ed., The Foucault Reader, Penguin, London 1984 p. 7. 
2
 Lyotard, Jean-Franois, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. xxv, 82. 
dissolution of the subject. The motif in the literature of postmodernity has been centered 
on attacking the subject. This motif has taken a variety of formulations, to witness the 
“death of man,” “the death of the author,” “the deconstruction of the subject,” “the 
displacement of the ego,” “the dissolution of self-identity,” and at times a combination of 
all of the above. The Cartesian Cogito is consistently and has been systematically 
rebuked by the postmodern theorists.  
However there are positions such as that of Calvin Schrag who believes that the 
dismantling of the subject as epistemological point and foundation does not entail a 
dismantling of the subject in every possible sense.3 In view of this, the study posits a side 
question; is the conception of a self even possible in postmodern thinking? If it is, what 
would it look like? I argue that it is, and Foucault offers the way for the subject to return 
in postmodern thought.  
Foucault explores the question of the subject by studying and analyzing the 
approaches taken by western philosophy from the ancient Greek times to the present 
and in the process, Foucault brings something new to our understanding of the self. This 
interest in the subject is found throughout his writings from his early works such as the 
Order of Things where he examines how in particular historical moments, people 
become objects of knowledge to his later works, the History of Sexuality, where he 
examines how people constitute themselves. His works deals with the emergence of 
what he calls the “man,” or the “subject,” in history and in discourse. Foucault publicized 
the death of man in one of his early writings, in which the reader is informed, “man is an 
invention of recent date” and will soon be “erased like a face drawn in the sand at the 
edge of the sea.”4 Nonetheless, it is from the prophet of the “death of man” where the 
author proposes how the subject can be resurrected in postmodern discussions. 
 
                                                 
3
 Schrag, Calvin O, “Rationality Between Modernity and Postmodernity,” Philosophical Papers, 
p.265. 
4
 Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Random House, 1970), p.387. 
Postmodernism and the Subject 
 Lyotard defines the postmodern as “incredulity toward meta-narratives.”5 As a 
result, new, hybrid disciplines develop without connection to old epistemic traditions, 
especially philosophy, and this means science only plays its own game and cannot 
legitimate others, such as moral prescription. 
The compartmentalization of knowledge and the dissolution of epistemic 
coherence is a concern for researchers and philosophers alike. As Lyotard notes, 
“Lamenting the „loss of meaning‟ in postmodernity boils down to mourning the fact that 
knowledge is no longer principally narrative”6 Indeed, for Lyotard, the de-realization of 
the world means the disintegration of narrative elements into “clouds” of linguistic 
combinations and collisions among innumerable, heterogeneous language games. 
Furthermore, within each game the subject moves from position to position, now as 
sender, now as addressee, now as referent, and so on. The loss of a continuous meta-
narrative therefore breaks the subject into heterogeneous moments of subjectivity that 
do not cohere into an identity. 
The dissolution of the subject and its implications for society is the theme of Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, which Deleuze published with Félix Guattari in 
1972. The book, in large part, is written against an established intellectual orthodoxy of 
the political Left in France during the 1950s and 1960s, an orthodoxy consisting of Marx, 
Freud, and structuralist concepts applied to them by Louis Althusser and Jacques Lacan. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that this mixture is still limited by representational thinking, 
including concepts of production based upon lack, and concepts of alienation based 
upon identity and negation. Furthermore, the Oedipus concept in psychoanalysis, they 
say, institutes a theater of desire in which the psyche is embedded in a family drama 
closed off from the extra-familial and extra-psychic forces at work in society. They 
                                                 
5
 Lyotard,  xxiv. 
6
 Ibid. p.26. 
characterize these forces as “desiring machines” whose function is to connect, 
disconnect, and reconnect with one another without meaning or intention. 
Baudrillard presents hyperreality as the terminal stage of simulation, where a sign 
or image has no relation to any reality whatsoever, but is “its own pure simulacrum.”7 The 
real, he says, has become an operational effect of symbolic processes, just as images 
are technologically generated and coded before we actually perceive them. This means 
technological mediation has usurped the productive role of the Kantian subject, the locus 
of an original synthesis of concepts and intuitions, as well as the Marxian worker, the 
producer of capital though labor, and the Freudian unconscious, the mechanism of 
repression and desire. “From now on,” says Baudrillard, “signs are exchanged against 
each other rather than against the real8”, so production now means signs producing 
other signs. The system of symbolic exchange is therefore no longer real but “hyperreal.” 
Where the real is “that of which it is possible to provide an equivalent reproduction,” the 
hyperreal, says Baudrillard, is “that which is always already reproduced.”9 The hyperreal 
is a system of simulation simulating itself.  
Problems in Filipino Identity 
 Identity simultaneously includes and excludes. To define one‟s self as a part of a 
group is to distance one‟s self from those who are outside it.10 Identity has many 
dimensions. Depending on the situation, one may choose to affirm an identity based, for 
instance, on family, religion, class, gender, or in this case, a nation. The preoccupation 
with a national identity is inevitable. The global village continues to be divided into 
nation-states, each protective of its interests and each eager to maximize its gains.11 In 
competing for prestige, identity is crucial, and with it heritage. In the European Union, for 
instance, the member states insist on the use of their own particular language even 
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 Baudrillard, Jean, Simulacra and Simulation, Sheila Faria Glaser (trans.), Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 1994 p.6. 
8
 Baudrillard, Jean, 1993, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Ian Hamilton Grant (trans.), London: 
Sage Publications. p.7. 
9
 Ibid. p.73. 
10
Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (1996). Questions of Cultural Identity. Sage Publications, London.. 
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 Foster 1991, Alonso 1994,  Kearney 1995. 
though one working language would be more efficient. At stake are pride, millennial 
traditions, and potential influence. The Republic of the Philippines is a marine 
archipelago of over 7100 islands and 85 million people of various ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural identities. Because of its history of colonizations (Spanish, American, Japanese), 
the predominance of Christianity, and the lack of a unified or prestigious pre-modern 
religious, political or economic order, the Philippines is frequently positioned as „in but not 
of Asia‟. Because Filipinos are made acutely aware of their peculiar trajectory as a 
modern nation-state and precarious position within the region, the dominant discourses of 
„the Philippines‟ have been too anxious to construct a genealogy of the modern nation-
state as telos and to assert some form of „Filipino‟ identity and spirit. 
 It is not easy to affirm a Filipino identity. As Dr. Emerita Quito observed, “Filipinos 
do not have time to philosophize  because   they   are  too  busy  earning   for   a  
living.12  Like many other nation-states the Philippines is culturally diverse. Many 
Filipinos particularly in the hinterlands, still preserve the animism and other ways of our 
ancestors in the face of Hispanization, Americanization and Islamization in the lowlands. 
Other Filipinos in Sulu and Mindanao has embraced Islam from the 14th to 15th 
centuries and through constructed states that resisted Spanish aggression. The majority 
embraced Christianity; accepted Hispanic and subsequently, American practices. 
Hispanization is present in varying degrees according to region and social class. It is 
more vivid in urban areas, particularly the metropolis than in the countryside, among the 
bourgeoisie than among the workers. While the Spanish language did not penetrate 
down to the peasant, Christianity did so, along with music, cookery, visual styles, 
vocabulary, and social customs from Spain and parts of Spanish America. Filipinos love 
their way of life. However, problems appear when they reflect on their identity and try to 
explain this to themselves, to fellow Filipinos or to outsiders. 
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 Quito, Emerita, The State of Philosophy in the Philippines Manila: De La Salle University  
Research Center, 1983, p. 9.  
 
 The term Filipino is a remnant of the Philippine colonial past. Named after a king 
of Spain (Philip II), the Philippines is a group of islands subjugated and colonized by 
Spain for 333 years. When I was involved in a student fellowship that brought to 
Singapore top students from all the ASEAN countries, I realized that the Filipino is far 
more distinct from its nearby South East Asian neighbors. Being the only Catholic 
country in an Islamic and Buddhist region, the Philippines have a totally, if not radically, 
different set of culture and value from the rest of South East Asia. 
 Despite the Philippines being one of the first democracies in Asia when it 
declared its independence from Spain in 1898, the independence was short-lived. The 
Americans took their turn as colonial masters of the islands through the Treaty of Paris in 
189813. The new colonial masters introduced a new lifestyle, education system and sets 
of values to Philippine society. The new entrants shifted social norms and practices, 
causing a major revolution on the Filipino way of thinking and habit. The restoration of its 
independence in 1945 proved to be a test of fire for the Philippines as it tried to seek out 
its national identity. The attempt to locate a national language (among the 80+ dialects 
within the islands), the trials to systematize bureaucracies across the country, the need 
to establish for a Filipino First Policy14, clearly manifests the lack of identity of the 
Philippines as a nation. Until now the Philippines continues to search for that one 
unifying identity from which they can anchor their nationhood. 
 I think the difficulty of generating a sense of nationhood is rooted in the fact that 
the Philippines is a Spanish and American construct. The histories written on and about 
the Philippines were seen through the colonial masters‟ eyes. The claim that the 
Spaniards “discovered” the Philippines has a grain of truth to it. There was no Philippines 
before the arrival of the Spaniards. The islands composing the archipelago were, back 
then, random groups of islands populated by different tribes and ethnic groups. What the 
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 The 1898 Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States discussed the terms ending the 
Spain-US war. This Treaty of Peace ceded the Philippines to the United States for $20,000,000. 
14
 Enacted during Pres. Carlos P. Garcia‟s presidency, the Filipino First Policy heavily favored 
Filipino businessmen over foreign investors. It is, at that time, the symbol of nationalist sentiments 
in Philippine politics. 
first colonial masters did was to unify the islands by force, as it dictated its boundaries 
and included the different tribes and ethnic groups living in the islands as part of its 
colony. Collectively they named the group of islands Las Islas Filipinas (the Philippine 
Islands) giving birth to a new nation. 
 I found Michel Foucault‟s philosophy as having an intriguing but emancipating set 
of theories that can enlighten me with the problem of identity, or better, help me answer 
the question of “Who are we?”15 This research is not focus on historical data; rather the 
research will explore Michel Foucault‟s ideas on how identity is formed according to his 
philosophy. This study explores what Michel Foucault calls 'subjectification', the dialectial 
process of self-making and being-made, within the context of ethnic identities and 
history. His idea of fashioning ourselves, an idea that developed towards the end of his 
career, is perhaps one of his most controversial ideas. This sudden stance on the 
subject is an unusual turn for his philosophy.16 More interesting is Foucault‟s 
endorsement of the idea that one can only fashion oneself in a collective manner. That, 
in the context of this research, the key to identifying and fashioning an identity is to 
understand identity in the histories of present.17An esteemed Filipino academic, Prof. 
Leonardo Mercado has extensively written about Filipino identity and philosophy offering 
different methodologies in defining the Filipino consciousness. Although we share the 
same pursuit and centralizes on the same problem, I chose to re-construct the Filipino 
identity using postmodern tools, tracing an alternative way of constructing a Filipino 
                                                 
15
 Foucault has been identified as a significant postcolonial writer because his ideas can help 
people come to terms with the implications of living in this post-colonial environment. Foucault 
was mainly interested in the ways which the discourse played colonizing roles in ordering 
experience, making sense of these experiences and distributing people within these orders.  
16
 This turn has been attacked and often claimed to be either the strength or weakness of his 
corpus of work. 
17
 His historical studies were intended to directly influence the lives of present day readers of 
history, in which case can be termed as histories of the present. Foucault thinks that different 
historical periods have radically different ways of ordering experience and making sense of it. His 
archeologies were not meant to capture the conscious thoughts and feelings of historical actors or 
recreate the truth or essence of a particular historical period. These actors and historical periods 
are in a sense, inventions of our time as scholars progressively reconstruct the past in order to 
serve the interest of the present. In this sense the Philippines in the 17
th
 century did not happen 
from 1601-1700 but rather it is an ongoing invention that has been subject to revisions and 
reconstructions through each subsequent era. 
identity apart from the methodologies he proposed. I found it more responsive to ground 
a method that is rooted in the philosophy of the present. Also, it is interesting to discuss 
identity and subject in a postmodern manner, as it seemingly is oxymoronic or perhaps 
better put in Foucauldian term, heterotopic.  
Foucault: A Postmodern Construction of Identity/Subject 
Foucault addresses the question of who we are by appealing to history. He hopes 
to give a richer, more robust answer to that question by abandoning both the 
universal/individual approach of Descartes, Freud and Sartre, and the ahistorically 
determined historical approach embraced by Marx. He rejects the universal/individual 
approach because it neglects the role that our history plays in creating who we are. He 
rejects Marx‟s approach because it submits that collective history to a determining 
principle, and thus circles back to the universalization of the first approach. Instead, 
Foucault sees the present as products of a contingent history. Our history has made us 
who we are today, not because it had to, but just because it did, because at certain 
junctures it took one path as opposed to another. Perhaps it took that path because of 
the influence of local events, or perhaps because of some mistaken or over-determined 
view of things that people had, or maybe because of chance.18 But for whatever reason it 
did. And thus we find ourselves here as opposed to there. 
It is important to ask what it means to say that we are a product, or largely a 
product, of a contingent history. This means more than it might mean on the surface. To 
embrace this view of ourselves is not simply to invoke history, contingency or both. Nor 
is it only to declare an intersection between the two. In Foucault‟s hands, to say that we 
are a product of a contingent history is to commit ourselves to a view of ourselves that 
has a number of characteristics. Together they add up to a radically new approach to the 
question of who we are and probably to the question of who we might be. 
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 For Foucault it happened because it did, there‟s no overarching or underlying principle or 
reason for it. It just did, because of different circumstances intersecting and producing the 
present. 
This view espouses that who we are is largely a collective matter, or, to put in 
another way, the question of who each of us is individually deeply bound to the question 
of who we are19. The collective determination of who we are is not something we can 
simply shake off; in being historical, who we are is embedded in a historical legacy that is 
not simply a matter of choice. That determination is very complex. It is not a single 
historical theme that makes us who we are at a given moment, but instead, an inter-play 
of themes that weave together, split apart, reform and transform. To see who we are, 
then, we must not look at ourselves with a bird‟s eye view. We must look at our particular 
historically given practices. These practices are tied up not only with how we act but also 
with how we go about knowing things20 and especially how we go about knowing 
ourselves. This historically given complex of practices through which we know and, 
indeed, are is contingent and therefore changeable. We did not control how we became 
who we are and who we are is not something that we can walk away from; nevertheless 
we do not have to be who we are. We can be otherwise. And to be otherwise, as it will 
turn out, is not simply an I can be. Usually it is something that we can be. 
We cannot think of ourselves simply as individuals, divorced from the historically 
given context in which we find ourselves. There are a number of theories that seem to 
want to consider us as atoms, as individuals inseparable from our specific context. For 
instance, the individualism of the traditional liberal political theory seems to see us thus. 
Liberal political theory has been attacked by communitarianism for allegedly neglecting 
our embeddedness in specific contexts. Although Foucault is not a communitarian, he 
tends to view those specific contexts with a more jaundiced eye than do communitarians 
– he ratifies the idea that who we are is not separable from them. 
Practices are what people live by. They determine who we are not by imposing a 
set of constraints from above, but through historically given norms through which we 
think and act. These historically given norms are neither divorceable from nor reducible 
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 So the idea of I rest on the we. 
20
 Or attempting to know them or thinking we know them. 
to what people often consider to be their larger historical context. But neither is it 
reducible to capitalism in the way that many Marxist would have it, as a superstructure 
that is simply erected upon the economic base. It is a practice or a group of practices 
that interact with other practices, both economic and non-economic, and that share or 
borrow or cross-fertilize or reinforce important themes, all in complex ways. 
The convergence, conflict, and reinforcement of practices can create effects that 
are unintended by those who participate in them. For instance, members of monasteries 
in the early 18th century and before do not intend their rigid daily schedule to be part of 
the larger social development of what Foucault calls discipline, a term he uses to cover 
the minute observation and regimentation of daily life under the banner of normality. 
Monks of the time, in their isolation, do not foresee that their practices will intersect with 
those of the Prussian army or prison reformers in order to foster the rise of normality as a 
crucial form of the operation of power in our world. However, since practices intersect 
with one another in various ways, even the relative isolation of monks cannot prevent the 
incorporation of their regimented life into other practices whose convergence gives way 
to disciplinary control. Foucault puts the point this way: “People know what they do; but 
what they don‟t know is what “what they do” does.”21 
If practices are engaged with one another in this way, then one can begin to 
understand the contingency of history, particularly in regard to its determination of who 
we are. The complexity of interacting practices does not lend itself to a single 
overarching theme. To see what is at play in our historical inheritance cannot be a matter 
of finding the key to unlock the mysteries of its workings; it must be a matter of looking at 
the unfolding, the evolution and the interaction of particular practices . in discovering who 
we are, there is no privileged place to look , no privileged theme to discover, but only the 
particularities of what has come before, structured by the various practices in which we 
are all engaged. 
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 Personal communication cited in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 187. 
This is not to deny that the contingency of history may give rise to important 
themes, themes that run across large swathe of specific historical context. Foucault often 
seeks to understand such themes as discipline, normalization, bio-politics, or in his 
earlier works, resemblance, classification, and death seen as a natural development of 
life. What it denies is that these themes structure the unfolding of history from above, 
from within, or outside it. These themes emerge from the unfolding of practices. Once in 
place, they may, for a time, react back on those practices to give them further structure. 
But this is not the case because the themes have an independence from our practices 
that they do so; it is precisely because they are inseparable from them. 
For Foucault, one of the most important aspects of the inseparability of themes 
from practices concerns knowledge. Although there are many shifts in Foucault‟s 
approach to history, changing from archeology, to genealogy and as I will explore, ethics, 
discovering the importance of power, turning from the external constitution of who we are 
to our own self-constitution –the pre-occupation with knowledge remains a constant with 
him. For Foucault, knowledge is something that always happens in our practices. One 
does not know anything from a standpoint outside the practices that constitute the 
person. Our knowledge is situated in our practices. This situating has several 
implications. 
A possible implication would be to hold on to the claim that knowledge changes 
as our practices change. In the unfolding of our contingent history, we will know things in 
different ways depending on the state and structure of our practices at a particular time. 
To put the point another way, we will know differently at different historical periods. This 
does not mean that knowledge is not possible, or that knowledge is merely a shifting 
opinion. Both views presume that we can somehow disown our practices, and with them 
our knowledge, to obtain a view above or outside them; in short, a view from nowhere. 
But that is precisely what Foucault‟s view precludes. 
Another implication of the embeddedness of our knowledge in our practices is 
that what goes on in those practices will affect how we go about the project of knowing. 
Our knowing is not only inseparable from our practices generally; it is inseparable from 
our norms and doings, and sayings those practices consist in. This idea becomes 
important in Foucault‟s genealogical works where the theme of power emerges as a 
central concern of his thought. If knowledge occurs within our practices, and power 
arises within those same practices, then there must be an intimate connection between 
knowledge and power. In contrast to those who would like to see knowledge that 
something that happens apart from the impurity of power relationships, knowledge and 
power are entwined. “Perhaps”, Foucault writes: 
“[W]e should abandon a whole tradition that allows us 
to imagine that knowledge can exist only where power 
relations are suspended… These “power-knowledge” 
relations are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a 
subject of knowledge who is or is not freeing relation to the 
power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, 
the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge 
must be regarded as so many effects of those fundamental 
implications of power-knowledge and their historical 
transformations.”22 
 
Foucault‟s oft-cited concept “power-knowledge” does not reduce knowledge to power. 
Nor does it see our purported knowledge as simply masking relations of power. Instead, 
it takes power and knowledge to be embedded in practices whose history and effects 
Foucault takes it as his task to understand and disclose. 
Scopes, Limitations and Methodology of the Study 
 At this juncture, I would like to point out a set of important caveats as the scope 
and limitations of this thesis. I am not going to offer a direct answer to the question “What 
is a Filipino?” Instead what I am offering is an indirect answer on how Filipinos become 
Filipinos. Answering the question of “What is a Filipino?” would require significant 
number of years plowing through historical texts and documents, analyzing continuities, 
and in Foucault‟s historiography more importantly, the discontinuities in history, studying 
social behavior and immersing in the different cultures currently unified under the term 
Filipino. This research, being conducted in a Philosophy department, will not do all these 
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23 the focus of this research is to explore how a unified subject or an identity is formed 
according to the methodologies proposed by Foucault. Furthermore, this study explores 
the possibility of a negotiated identity constructed through discourse, plurality and 
perhaps a hybrid. 
A major part of the exposition will be allotted to Foucault‟s main tool for analyzing 
history: archeology and genealogy. For Foucault, the role of his archeological and 
genealogical studies is to equip readers with critical tools to understand how their identity 
or how they think of themselves has been fashioned by historical forces. By 
understanding this, Foucault offers a third way, wherein he is suggesting that we may be 
able to intervene in the fashioning of our identity. 
This thesis will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will stand to 
introduce the reader to what can be expected in this research project, the main question 
that will be asked, and how I will go about answering the question “How can we establish 
a Filipino identity?” In order to answer this question, however, I will resort to asking the 
same question Foucault asks, “Who are we?” He answered this question throughout his 
prolific career, and I will attempt to cover as much ground as I personally can, mainly 
focusing on his major representative works and some selected essays.  
The second chapter will deal with Foucault‟s approach to the study of history: 
archeology and genealogy. Archeology isolates various orders of discourse which laid 
down the conditions for articulating thoughts and ideas, propositions and statements 
through which people made sense of their historical time. The Genealogical method 
complements what archeology lacks or fails to answer.24Genealogy deals with non-
discursive mechanisms power which shaped the way people saw the world and acted 
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within it. These two tools of analyzing history explores the actor, the situation, the reader 
and the writer of history all at the same time giving the academic a comprehensive view 
of the historical landscape. It is important to trace his ideas as it will be the trajectory 
from which he will establish himself as a philosopher who is primarily concerned about 
how we make sense of ourselves.  
The first part of the third chapter will tackle Foucault‟s later works particularly the 
last two volumes of the History of Sexuality and his 1981-1982 lectures at the College de 
France, collectively entitled Hermeneutics of the Subject. This chapter will offer an 
exposition on how Foucault allows the subject to fashion itself, perhaps in a way, the 
continuation of his project as it offers a way for subjects to not only find out about 
themselves but more importantly partake in their formation. This particular period of 
Foucault‟s intellectual journey have been seen as his weak spot. I argue that it‟s not. 
Instead I will claim that it is the completion of his main project or at least offers the 
closest semblance of a conclusion to what he has set out to do, answer the question 
“Who are we?” In concluding the chapter I will offer four things (1) I will be using some 
historical analysis on how the Filipino has made sense of it‟s identity, negotiating its way 
through its colonized past (2) I will also suggest how Filipino show how Filipinos are 
partakers in the construction of their identity (3) Is it a stretch to actually use Foucault‟s 
re-conceptualization of the subject in establishing a Filipino identity? (4) Finally, I will be 
discussing the methodologies Mercado proposed and point out what I found was lacking 
from it and present my proposed tool in constructing a Filipino identity, which can be an 








Foucauldian Historiography: Discovering How We Think of Ourselves 
Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by multiple forms of 
constraint… Each society has its “general politics” of truth; that is, the 
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements, 
the means by which each is sanctioned – Michel Foucault25 
 
The Archeological Method 
 
The Archeology of Knowledge, appearing in 1969, serves as Foucault‟s 
methodological reflection on his early works.26 It not only reconstructs a common 
methodology that he used in his earlier works, but it also articulates a methodology that 
those books, to a greater or lesser extent, attempt to achieve. He summarizes his earlier 
projects in the conclusion to The Archeology of Knowledge: 
The positivities I have tried to establish must not be 
understood as a set of determinations imposed from the 
outside on the thought of individuals, or inhabiting them from 
the inside, in advance as it were; they constitute rather the 
set of conditions in accordance with which a practice is 
exercised, in accordance with which that practice gives rise 
to partially or totally new statements, and in accordance with 
which it can be modified.27 
 
His precise approach to history resisted the idea of continuities and the idea that the 
historical structure of knowledge in a given practice or group of practices during a given 
period can be changed by the conscious efforts of individuals to change it. 
Foucault believed that there are particular regularities that govern what can and 
cannot be legitimately said in particular practices or during particular times. Let us be 
clear about it, it is not impossible to say certain things but there are restrictions. The 
restriction is neither a physical nor legal one; rather it is epistemic.28 These regularities 
function as some sort of a rule. These are not conscious rules that dictate what can be 
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 That is, it has something to do with knowledge. 
said or cannot be said. Instead these rules are unconscious structuring of discourse that 
sets the character and boundaries of how debate and discussions can happen. 
 Foucault in the preface of the Order of Things has referred to these structuring 
as the positive unconscious of knowledge.29 These structurings are not principles 
dictated by the outside, it transcends the practice itself and then imposed on it. But 
neither is a set of boundaries agreed upon by the participants. They are frameworks or 
perspectives by means of which participants in a discussion recognize themselves as 
participants and the statements of those participants are recognized as contributions to a 
particular discussion, or as establishing certain points, or making certain claims or as 
performing certain acts. 
Foucault introduces the term archive. The archive defines a particular level that of 
a practice that causes a multiplicity of statements to emerge as so many regular events, 
as so many things to be dealt with and manipulated.30 Given his definition of archive, 
Foucault then defines Archeology as that which describes discourses as practices 
specified in the element of the archive.31 Contrasting it to viewing history as continuous 
or progressive, archeology takes history to involve a particular structuring of what can 
and cannot legitimately be said, as well as how and by whom they can legitimately be 
said during certain periods. These structurings can and do change. The change is not 
because of an improvement on knowledge or through the efforts of individuals, although 
those things can contribute to a change. Foucault does not really say much about why 
they change. But because knowledge is structured in this way, having change as 
inevitable, the change happen, it constitutes a break or a rift with the previous 
structuring.  
In the Order of Things, Foucault introduces the term episteme, a concept that 
found the book‟s approach. He defines his project as: 
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…attempting to bring to light …the epistemological 
field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart 
from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its 
objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests 
a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather 
that of its conditions of possibility; in this account , what 
should appear are those configurations within the space of 
knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of 
empirical science …on the archeological level, we see that 
the system of positivities was transformed in a whole sale 
fashion at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.32 
 
 Viewing episteme this way keeps the general methodological approach Foucault 
describes in the Archeology of Knowledge. Although the term archive was used, it plays 
a similar role as the episteme. The issue really is to look at the positivities of our 
knowledge, not by means of an account of the progress of knowledge, but rather by the 
means of the structuring that, in a given historical period, form its “conditions of 
possibility.” It is not what is said that is the focus but rather how what is said arises from 
what can be said, or at least legitimately said, at a particular time and place. 
 Aside from his general methodological claim, Foucault focuses his discussion on 
three specific special areas of knowledge; those that have come to be called economics, 
biology and linguistics. He finds a somewhat similar structuring of knowledge running 
across these fields, and, moreover, similar changes to their structuring during different 
time periods. His discussion unfolds in three stages. He starts off first with the 
renaissance thought, then he went back to the Classical period and finally turns towards 
more recent development during his time. 
 Renaissance knowledge, he finds, can be summed up in the idea of 
resemblances. There are relations of resemblance among different elements and 
aspects of the universe. The project of knowledge then is to discover those relations. 
This project cannot be carried out through the use of empirical methods of discovery, 
since resemblances are an invisible aspect of the cosmos that is woven into it rather 
something one can discover through observation and experimentation. To discover 
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resemblances one needs to interpret the cosmos rather than perceive it. The project of 
drawing out resemblances is not a simple matter of seeing them. It requires patient 
intellectual work, especially when one realizes that resemblances can occur in a variety 
of ways. Foucault isolated four of them; convenientia, aemulatio, analogy and sympathy. 
Convenientia occurs through proximity; the soul is proximate to the body and so they 
resemble each other. Aemulatio is convenientia but without spatial proximity, it is 
resemblance at a distance. Analogy allows for resemblances that occur by thematic 
likeness between more disparate objects. Sympathy is a free-floating resemblance that 
suffuses the cosmos. These forms of resemblance constitutes the framework by which 
the Renaissance epistemic project took place. 
 In this framework, language functions as a participant rather than as an external 
element. The operation of language, just like other things, is woven into the fabric of 
resemblances that constitute the universe. “ The relation of languages to the world is one 
of analogy rather than signification; or rather their value as signs and their duplicating 
function is superimposed; they speak of the heaven and of the earth of which they are 
the image.”33 The language that articulates that world is also of the order of the world; 
they are inseparable in the Renaissance episteme. 
 When they separate, when the working language is no longer a piece of the 
cosmos, the Renaissance episteme has then given way to the classical one. If 
Renaissance knowledge can be summed up in the idea of resemblance, the classical 
period receives can be summed up in the word Order. Order is a matter, not of analogy, 
but of representation. To understand the classical order we must approach it by way of 
understanding language as a representing medium.  
 Representation begins when the relation between the sign and what it signifies is 
no longer a natural one. “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the peculiar 
existence and ancient solidity of language as a part and parcel of the fabric of the world 
were dissolved in the functioning of representation; language then had value only as a 
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discourse.”34 There are objects on the one side and the signs that represent them on the 
other. This is not to say that language has withdrawn from its place in the universe to 
become something else, something other. Rather, it is the relations between signs and 
their signification that has lost its status as a natural one. The sign removes itself before 
the object it signifies and in turn the object reveals itself without remainder in the signs. 
He notes: 
The signifying element has no content, no function, 
and no determination other than what it represents; it is 
entirely ordered upon and transparent to it. But this content 
is indicated only in a representation that posits itself as such, 
and that which it signifies resides, without residuum and 
without opacity, within the representation of the sign.35 
 
 The relation between signifier and signified is exhausted in the relations of 
representation. There is no longer, as there was in the Renaissance, a silent web of 
resemblance that would constitute to aether in which signs and their objects are 
immersed. There is no human consciousness that must be taken into account because 
of its effect on the operation of language. The relation is simply a binary one. 
 Foucault is not saying that there is no relation between a sign and its object. 
Instead, to clarify, what no longer exists in the classical period is the web of 
resemblances in which language fits. The internal bond that is lost is the aether of 
resemblance, the cosmic play of convenientia, aemulatio, analogy and sympathy that 
binds all of existence together. It is that bond that is broken with the emergence of 
classical representation. 
 If the primitive source of knowledge is that of representations, then the project of 
knowledge becomes that of ordering those representations. We should think of the term 
order not as an overarching order in which everything has its place but rather as a 
project of ordering that is the theme of classical knowledge. Signs are no longer texts 
with hidden meanings to be deciphered; they are now representations that must be put in 
a proper order so that understanding can occur. One starts with the simple ones, and 
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then builds more and more complex systems of representations. Thus the idea of a 
table, the table that gives the proper order to things becomes central to the episteme:  
The sciences carry within themselves the project, however 
remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they 
are always directed too, toward the discovery of simple 
elements and their progressive combination; and at their 
center they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a 
system contemporary with itself.36 
  
Order is not the project itself; just like representation, it is the framework, the 
structuring of the project. Within this structuring debates take place. The structure of 
order allows for opposition and contradiction. It requires an ordering of representations 
into their proper tables. Claims and positions that cannot be fitted within the context of 
order are not allowed.  
As an example of the project of order at work, consider the emergence of natural 
history. Foucault points out that natural history is not the same thing as biology. The 
latter is concerned with the concept of life, the former with the concept of living beings. 
Living beings need not be brought under the sway of a single concept unless there is a 
commitment to that concept underlying the epistemic project. Natural history does not 
have that concept. What it has is a project of ordering. 
 Ordering, in contrast to the episteme of the Renaissance, starts with observation. 
We observe a plentitude of living beings in the world. There is no necessary hierarchy of 
order, no Order that is presented to us. The project of ordering lies in utilizing 
observation so as to achieve order. Language is vital, since representation allows 
objects to be given to us as they are; 
Natural history has a condition of its possibility the 
common affinity of things and language with representation; 
but it exists as task only in so far as things and language 
happen to be separate. It must therefore reduce this 
distance between them so as to bring language as close as 
possible to the observing gaze, and the things observed as 
close as possible to words. Natural history is nothing more 
than nomination of the visible.37 
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 For natural history, the visible is the privileged means of access to the 
observable. It is the visible that reduces the distance between things and their terms, 
more than the other senses. This reduction is only the first step. Nomination, if it stays at 
the level of simple naming is not enough. There is representation but not yet order. The 
nomination of natural history must create order among the diversity of nature and the 
names that represent it. Nomination must create a structure. It does so by means of: 
…four variables only: the form of the elements, the 
quantity of those elements, the manner in which they are 
distributed in space in relation to each other , and the 
relative magnitude of each element.38 
 
First, one starts with simple representations, in this case the elements; then one 
observes and records show those elements are combined in terms of quantity, spatial 
relation, and relative magnitude. Out of theses combinations one builds tables. Those 
tables then show the place of each living being relative to its neighbors. One then 
creates a taxonomy. In a sense, one botanizes living beings. As Foucault tells us, “The 
book becomes the herbarium of living structures.”39 
In the course of building a taxonomy, language itself undergoes reflection. As 
things are brought into a systematic relation with each another, so are the terms that 
represent them. This is probably why there is a close relationship between natural history 
and language, closer in a sense, than between natural history and biology. 
Near the beginning of the nineteenth century, the classical episteme undergoes 
an upheaval that induces epistemic changes, changes in the structure of the archive that 
frames the investigations of natural history, the theories of money and value, and general 
grammar, and perhaps the entirety of Western knowledge.40Natural history became 
biology, the theories of money and value became economics and general grammar 
became linguistics. The change that occured might be characterized as the addition of a 
new depth or dimension to the world of knowledge.  
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 This depends on how one reads the claims Foucault advances. 
To see this new dimension, we can turn to the emergence of biology as an 
example. Unlike natural history, biology is concerned with life. It is not an investigation of 
living beings simply being ordered, but it concerns itself with the organic nature 
underlying them. This new investigation “was to be based on a principle alien to the 
domain of the visible – an internal principle that is not reducible to the reciprocal 
interaction of representations. This principle (corresponding to labor in the economic 
sphere) is organic in nature.”41Life in biology, labor in economics, hidden grammatical 
structure in linguistics: these are the new concepts around which the project of 
knowledge is to be undertaken. 
These concepts do more than just broaden an epistemic structure that is in place. 
Instead, they formed the pivot around which the entire structure changed. Once the 
depth of an underlying reality is brought into the framework of knowledge, the goal of 
ordering and the assumption of representation are simply lost.  
Ordering is lost because it is in thrall only to the visible. One orders the visible; 
one brings what can be seen and what can be said or what is seen closer together. The 
depth that was introduced in the nineteenth century is not of the order of the visible, but 
an underlying structure or nature. To investigate that is not merely adding a dimension to 
ordering; it abandons it. 
Representation is lost because of the assumption that words and things no longer 
match up as cleanly as the classical age thought they did. Now there are elusive depths 
and dimensions that undergrids the visible and its representation. One can no longer 
count on the removing of the sign before the object or the ability of the sign to render the 
object without a remainder. In fact, it is precisely the remainder that became the interest. 
This loosening of the bonds of representation corresponded to two spaces of 
depth, one on the side of the sign and/or the observer; the other is on the side of the 
object. For human beings and the world they confront, there is more to be understood 
than presented itself in the classical period. This “more” is not that of the Renaissance, 
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with its resemblances folded into the cosmos. It is instead the more of a seemingly 
elusive depth that lies beyond one‟s ability to grasp it conceptually. 
This dual depth Foucault characterizes reminds us of Kant‟s noumenon. Foucault 
comments that the empirical studies of biology, economics and linguistics are the other 
side of the same epistemic framework that fosters transcendental philosophy. For the 
former: 
The conditions of possibility of experience are being 
sought in the conditions of possibility of the object and its 
existence, whereas in transcendental reflection the 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are 
identified with the conditions of possibility of experience 
itself. The new positivity of the sciences of life, language, 
and economics is in correspondence with the founding of 
transcendental philosophy.42 
 
Although, as Foucault notes, the character of transcendental philosophy will change 
radically in the new episteme from that of Kantian philosophy, the introduction of the 
depth can be glimpsed in the example of his philosophy. 
 This new episteme is characterized by a particular instability. There is a wavering 
in this episteme between the empirical and the transcendental, each forming, although 
insufficiently, the epistemic ground of the other. Because of both sides‟ hidden depth, 
neither the empirical sciences nor transcendental philosophy can complete their task of 
grounding their knowledge. The empirical sciences cannot do this because the depth 
they seek is not reducible to empirical methods; they must appeal to transcendental 
philosophy. Alternatively transcendental philosophy is a self-reflection on a self that 
always, ultimately, eludes the reflection. There is more depth that can be grasped by 
reflectors themselves; thus there is a constant appeal outside transcendental philosophy 
to the empirical sciences. 
 The wavering appears in four guises. Foucault calls the first guise „the analytic of 
finitude”. The person engaged in reflection or investigation is finite in character and in 
knowledge. Finitude thus becomes both the object of investigation in the arising human 
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sciences of biology, economics and linguistics, and the limitation on knowledge of the 
investigation itself, since it is a human being who is doing the investigating. The second 
guise is the “empirico-transcendental doublet”, in which human being, man, is at once 
the ground and object of investigation. The third guise is “the cogito and the unthought”, 
in which thinkers keep seeking the unthought grounding of their own thought, which in 
turn moves away further toward the horizon as they pursue it. Finally, there is “the retreat 
and return of origin”. It is an endless search for an origin that must be there because it is 
founding, but cannot be grasped precisely because it is founding; it founds the search 
that is seeking it.43 
The commonality among these four guises is a kind of depth that performs three 
roles at once. First, it is constitutive of our approach to the question of who we are. 
Secondly, it is the object of investigation. Since representation can no longer be taken for 
granted, one must delve into the depths of man in order to discover the origins or the 
grounds of knowledge. Finally, it is that which always escapes the attempt to grasp it. It 
is a depth that in the same gesture both constitutes who we are and eludes our 
understanding of it. 
The center of this episteme is what Foucault calls man. Man is not the human 
biological entity. Nor is he the creature with reason. Man is the privileged moment of the 
current episteme. Man is both the source and the object of investigation, the being in 
depth that creates the paradoxes that is inherent in the framework of knowledge. Man is 
what seeks to know himself, but in order to do so must treat himself as at once the 
knower and the known, and must constantly swing back and forth between the two. This 
of course is an impossible task, an endless one that can never be completed. For when 
man gets close to being known, one must always recognize that it is oneself-as knower- 
that is engaged in the knowing. To draw a simple analogy, it is like trying to see one‟s 
own eyes. 
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If Kant was awaken by Hume from his “dogmatic slumber”, Foucault borrows the 
image, saying that in the modern episteme we are in the midst of an “anthropological 
sleep”, a type of dogmatic slumber that dreams only of man, or better, that dreams itself 
as man dreaming of man. That sleep is characterized by the emergence of the human 
sciences, the sciences of man, which is by man. 
For Foucault, then, “man is a recent invention”.44 This does not mean that human 
beings are a recent invention, or that we only recently come to recognize human beings 
as something special within human nature, or that we shall soon give way to another 
type of creature. What is recent is man as the privileged source and object of 
investigation: 
Man has been a figure occurring between two modes 
of language; or rather he was constituted only when 
language, having been situated within representation and, as 
it were, dissolved in it, freed itself from that situation at the 
cost of its fragmentation; man composed his own figure in the 
interstices of that fragmented language.45 
 
Man, the being of depth that arises when representation no longer captures the relation 
of words and things, is a historical entity. And like all historical entities, man passes and 
something new will arise. Not human beings but man, in the very particular sense, has 
arisen in the current episteme. 
 Foucault concludes The Order of Things with the oracular but ultimately historical 
claim that if the current episteme begins to lose its grip on us, then “man would be 
erased like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea‟.46 This pronouncement is not a 
prediction of some kind of an ontological fall of human beings, or man‟s dissolution into 
some other world. This should be taken as an offering of a possibility that, just as 
knowledge was once arranged in such a way that man as the privileged figure of depth 
does not occur, so it can be arranged that way again. In the three epistemes Foucault 
investigates, the position of man as at once subject and object of knowledge arises in 
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only one. There is no reason not to believe that this episteme, like previous ones, will 
pass and with its passing will also pass man as its privileged center. 
 The Order of Things is a book about who we are and about who we take 
ourselves to be. And in that sense, via negativa, it is at the same time about who we are 
not. What the book accomplished is to give a view of who we are; the view given through 
the recently arising of the human sciences and to show that the view is historically 
situated. The human sciences do not tell us who we are; or better yet, they do not tell us 
who we are in a way that is absolute.  They are investigations into who we are that are 
situated within a certain way of approaching us, a certain episteme and its specific 
orientation. This does not mean that we are not what the human sciences tell us. To 
claim that, it would require a bird‟s-eye view of who we are. But if Foucault is right about 
the existence of epistemes, there is no such thing as a bird‟s-eye view from which to 
pass such a judgment. His claim is that we do not have to take ourselves as what the 
human sciences tell us we are. There are other ways to see ourselves. The Order of 
Things is about who we are in a very specific sense, it is a book about the historical 
character of who we take ourselves to be. 
 The archeological method shows the historical contingency of our being who we 
are. Foucault‟s refusal to account for how epistemes change reflects a leeriness about 
progressive views of history. By allowing historical breaks or discontinuities into his 
narratives, he rejects the idea that each episteme is a necessary improvement on the 
previous one. But in the rejection, there is also a commitment to historical contingency. 
Since later frameworks do not necessarily stem from the earlier ones, the order of 
historical frameworks is not pre-given. There is no particular reason why representation 
had to follow resemblance or why the mad in Madness and Civilization had to be freed 
from physical bondage in order to suffer moral bondage in the late eighteenth century. 
Foucault does not deny that earlier events can cause later ones. However, he does not 
seek to account for that causality, which implies that he does not see a pattern that 
governs historical change. Historical change is, then, contingent. 
 That we cannot just shake off the historical frameworks in which we find 
ourselves is not something Foucault argues explicitly. However, we can say that it 
follows from his approach. Foucault does not argue that nothing can be done to change 
historical frameworks; in fact they do change. But he does not see those changes as 
being wrought simply by individual initiatives. One might want to argue that since he 
does not account for historical breaks, he must think that nobody has any ability to 
contribute to historical change. We are all simply prisoners of our own epistemes. 
 That would take Foucault‟s inhibition to account for change too far. Foucault can 
be said to be agnostic (at best) about our relation to historical change, not atheistic to it. 
To say that we cannot simply shake off our historical heritage is not to say that we can 
have no effect on it. Can we, as individuals or in a collective manner, create historical 
change? Foucault remained silent on this. His reluctance to discuss how people affect 
the historical trajectories he recounts has led many scholars to think that he is a fatalist. 
This charge has followed not only his archeological work but also his genealogical works 
as well. In the latter case, the accusation is more stinging because the genealogical 
works are more politically charged. Their stakes concern who we are as a product of 
relations of power, and specifically relations of power and knowledge. When power is at 
stake, the claim that we cannot do anything about it seems more despairing if not 
cynical. 
 However let us take Foucault‟s histories to be anything other than what he often 
says they are: tools to be used to understand our situation. He does not give us 
ontological accounts of who we are, and he definitely is not seeking to answer questions 
about free will and determinism. The freedom he accords us comes not from within the 
deep structure of human beings, but within the fragile and contingent nature of our 
history. Therefore, he does not see himself as owing us a general account of the ways 
people can or cannot affect their historical situation, but instead he is just offering an 
account of the situation itself. 
 When he moves to his later genealogical works, Foucault articulates a deeper 
interaction between the discourse of the human sciences, their practices and application. 
At this stage, Foucault became more interested at the discursive level than at the level of 
practice.47 
 The issue of the complexity of who we are is itself a complex one. It depends, in 
part, on one‟s view of the status of archeology. Foucault seems to be unclear at this 
stage in his writings about the range of application of his analyses. One might question 
the episteme’s extent of reach in particular historical periods. Sometimes Foucault 
characterizes them as structures that lie beneath entire cultural formations. At other 
times he denies this. For instance, in The Archeology of Knowledge, he writes “The 
relations I have described are valid in order to define a particular configuration: they are 
not signs to describe the face of a culture in its totality”.48 At the archeological stage, it is 
unclear whether the archeological layers he uncovers are meant to characterize a 
smaller or larger part of the terrain he‟s investigating. 
 Questions can be raised concerning the relations between the discursive and the 
non-discursive. Although Foucault claims to be investigating both, the archeological 
works place their focus on what is said at the expense of what is done. Is there a 
separable relation between the two, or is it that, in order to understand one requires at 
the same time an investigation of the other? To understand what is said or what can be 
said, should we have an investigation of the doings in which those sayings are caught 
up, which frames them and confer their legitimacy or illegitimacy? Or, does the relation 
between the two not also flow in the other direction, where certain sayings create or 
prevent the doing they come into contact with? Perhaps it would be best to drop the 
distinction between the two altogether and investigate the practices in which both arise 
simultaneously? 
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 Concerning the archives that Foucault describes, questions of specificity and 
their generality can be brought up. Archeology, which works across a particular 
chronological stratum, seems to imply a commonality among discourses in a given 
historical period, both within a culture and across cultures. Can we commit Foucault to 
this? Should we follow the lead of the works themselves which seem more expansive in 
this regard? Or instead, should we ratify some of the comments he made about the 
works, often afterwards, which point to a more limited scope? Foucault himself seems to 
struggle with this problem. 
 In The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault tells us, consistent with the approach 
of his writings, that “it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from 
within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives us what we can say”.49 This 
statement raises two questions, one having to do with the statement itself, and the other 
its implications for his own histories. As far as the statement itself goes, there is a 
problem of what is known philosophically as reflexivity. If it is not possible for us to 
describe our own archive, how does he know that we speak within its rules? To know 
that would seem to imply that we can step outside our own archive, at least far enough to 
recognize that it has a particular set of rules. But that is precisely what Foucault says 
cannot be done. There is something self-defeating about it, since it assumes a 
standpoint that the statement itself denies. It seems that the best Foucault can do in this 
situation is to plead ignorance about the archival nature of his own discourse. 
 The implication for his histories is this. If we are speaking from within our own 
archive, and if its rules and norms are as ungrounded and as changeable as, say, that of 
the classical or the modern episteme, what does that mean for the status of historical 
narratives? Are they accurate depictions of the frameworks of knowledge that operate in 
the periods he describes? Or perhaps should we see them simply as descriptions that 
come from a particular archive, no worse and no better than competing descriptions that 
could be offered from the perspective of different archives? 
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 Foucault concludes The Archeology of Knowledge with a written self-interview. It 
is an honest piece of self-reflection during which he asks himself, “What then is the title 
of your discourse? Where does it come from and from where does it derive its right to 
speak? How could it be legitimated?” He responds: “I admit that this question 
embarrasses me more than your earlier objections… my discourse, far from determining 
the locus in which it speaks, is avoiding the ground on which it can find support.”50 The 
question of the status of Foucault‟s archeological writings is one that he never resolves. 
It remains alongside the issue of the relation of the discursive and non-discursive and the 
question of the general scope of the archeologies, among the challenges facing 
Foucault‟s archeological project. He does not adequately answer them, because he 
moves on to another project, or at least modifies the project enough to give it another 
name. Genealogy replaces archeology. 
 Should we reproach him for this? Does he owe us an account of the success or 
failure of archeology to address these questions? He does not think so. When he 
confronts himself, at the outset of The Archeology of Knowledge, with the charge that he 
keeps changing the character of what he is doing, he responds by saying, “Do not ask 
who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police that papers are in order.”51 This is, what I think, is the right response. Not because 
one should never answer for anything one writes, but because one need not answer for 
everything one writes, every aspect of one‟s perspective. Sometimes it is enough to 
move on. 
 Most philosophers spend the early part of their careers staking out a small piece 
of philosophical territory, and the rest of their professional lives patrolling that territory 
rather than investigating what else might be out there. Foucault moves on. His 
archeologies are a type of investigation, his genealogies another. If Foucault does not 
offer us the model of philosophical consistency because he changes directions several 
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times over the course of his career, and if he loses (or gains whatever the case might be) 
readers in the process, perhaps we should not fault him for this. We should look at his 
works the way he sees them: investigations, enquiries into who we are and how we got 
to be that way.  
The Genealogical Method 
 Upon taking his new position at the College de France, Michel Foucault 
announced his future research program. It is comprised of two aspects: the first is a 
critical one that isolates “the forms of exclusion, limitation and appropriation of 
discourse.”52 The second is a genealogical one; it will show “how series of discourse are 
formed, through, in spite of, or with the aid of these systems of constraint; what were the 
specific norms for each, and what were the conditions of appearance, growth, and 
variation.”53 Genealogy is the project that Foucault eventually embraced. He has moved 
on from archeology and he has shifted his focus from the purely discursive to incorporate 
the non-discursive as well. He gives this historical description the name genealogy. 
 Most people are familiar with the term in its application to familial lineage. To 
trace a family genealogy is to trace one‟s ancestors, to follow backwards (or forward) the 
marriage and kinship lines that produced oneself. There is something like this that goes 
on in Foucault‟s genealogies. The idea of asking who one is by tracing how one has 
arrived at this point is similar to this method. Just as the roots of a family genealogy can 
become more dispersed the further back (or further forward) one goes, Foucault‟s 
genealogies do not find themselves at a particular privileged starting point. There is no 
pristine moment of origin, no point of creation; everything begins dispersed, without 
center or unity. 
 But let‟s also take note of the important differences as well. Instead of tracing the 
evolution of marriages Foucault traces the evolution of practices. Secondly, and following 
directly from this, the question of who one becomes, as it is in the archeological works, a 
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collective question rather than an individual one. The product of the Foucauldian 
genealogy surprisingly is a we not an I. Thirdly, in as much as familial genealogies seek 
to give a single answer to the question of who one is, Foucault breaks with that 
approach. Unlike a family genealogy, where there can only be one, genealogies of 
practices are many and various. We are involved in many different practices, and 
although particular ones may be more important in determining who we are, no single 
one or no single group has a privileged position. Fourthly, Foucault‟s genealogies are 
tied to the politics of truth. It is not simply practices that Foucault is interested in; it is the 
politics and epistemology of those practices, and the bond between their politics and 
epistemology. 
 Genealogy is a term that Foucault borrowed from Nietzsche.54 Nietzsche used it 
to describe the emergence of what he thinks of as force relations in regard to particular 
institutions or practices. The debt that Foucault owes to Nietzsche in adopting the 
genealogical method is clearly expressed in an essay he publishes in 1971, entitled 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” a rendering of Nietzsche‟s genealogical method and an 
announcement of his own. It begins with a description, “Genealogy is gray, meticulous, 
and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, 
on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.”55 These words 
offer, perhaps, a better characterization of Foucault‟s more detailed approach than 
Nietzsche‟s, but it does emphasize the historical character of both projects. The similarity 
deepens as the essay unfolds. 
 After a critique of histories that rely on the concept of origins and grand 
beginnings, Foucault noted that Nietzsche‟s genealogical method is engaged in a twofold 
task: descent and emergence. Together they constitute a historical approach that 
abandons the ideas of history as having particular aims or goals, a unified goal with a 
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decipherable meaning, and having an essential origin that has made us who we. 
Descent (Herkunft) approaches history by seeking the separate, dispersed events that 
have come together in a contingent way to form a particular practice. Instead of looking 
for the threads that bind history together, it seeks the coming-to-be of a practice in 
events that are often small, ignored and disparate from one another. Emergence 
(Entstehung) on the other hand, describes the “hazardous play of dominations.”56 That 
forms the history of a given practice or group of practices. Emergence, in Nietzsche‟s 
view, is a matter of the domination of active and reactive forces. Instead of seeking the 
meaning of practice in the goals it sets itself, Nietzsche asks whether a practice is 
oriented towards creation or expression or rather towards resentment and small 
mindedness. But as Foucault sees it, emergence, is a matter of what effects, the uses to 
which practices are put, give rise at different times and places. 
 Together, descent and emergence offer a view of history that traces the 
emergence and dissolution of practices and of the unities those practices temporarily 
(and arbitrarily) form with other practices. Disparate practices come together and then 
disperse in unpredictable ways; it is a history in which this coming together and 
dispersing produces a number of unforeseen effects that result in a variety of 
dominations. This does not mean that recounting history is pointless.  Genealogy allows 
us to see how aspects of ourselves that we thought were natural or inescapable turn out 
to be only historical, and putting it more bluntly historically contingent. We did not have to 
become who we are and in turn we can become something other than what we are. 
Foucault‟s genealogies do not seek to cover the broad sweep of our historical 
legacy. Having been more clearly and consciously written than his archeological works, 
Foucault takes his genealogies to trace aspects of who we have come to be, of who we 
are now. If our history is a matter of the unfolding of temporary unities from dispersed 
origins, then who we are is matter not of any particular unity but of a variety of 
overlapping and intersecting unities of practices. Although at times Foucault uses images 
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that suggest he is describing an entire cultural formation, a closer reading of his 
genealogical works shows that those images are rhetorical rather than substantive.  
There are two major works of Foucault that falls under the category of 
Genealogy; Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. Of the 
two only Discipline and Punish can be considered as a full-fledged historical study. The 
latter is both methodological and programmatic. It offers a clear delineation of the 
method that was used in Discipline and Punish and is to be used in a larger study of 
sexuality. Foucault later turned from his proposed study of sexuality to a larger project of 
self-construction, widening the historical scope of his study.57 
Discipline and Punish displays an important similarity to Foucault‟s Madness and 
Civilization, as he performs an inversion of a received view. The inversion that he 
performs is not a simple one. Denying the assumption of a progressive history does not 
require us to embrace a regressive history. The inversion Foucault‟s studies perform 
seeks to show that what has been called a progressive historical moment is 
accompanied by a movement that is also damaging. This does not necessarily reverse 
the assumption of historical progress. It complicates it. 
In its early form of, punishment takes the form of retribution. The offender is 
beneath or beyond human concern. Having committed a crime, the offender is then 
subject to any form of punishment the social body deems appropriate. Torture, physical 
and psychological abuse, public humiliation; these are among the range of punishments 
available to a society that wants to get back at criminals for the wrongs committed. The 
story goes that we have become more civilized. Rehabilitation replaced torture and 
public punishment as the preferred response to crime. Instead of simply punishing the 
criminals for what they have done, we now seek to reform them. Crime then is not simply 
an act that requires vengeance; it became a behavior that requires intervention. Whether 
it is by instilling proper work habits, or offering insights into the causes of the deviant 
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behavior, or breaking the individuals down boot camp style and rebuilding them, or 
reinforcing good habits while trying to extinguish bad ones, or a combination of these, 
criminals are not to be harmed. They are supposed to be improved. 
In this way, the treatment of criminals has become more humane. Punishment no 
longer serves as a ceremony of degradation and abuse; it was transformed as a policy of 
improvement. Penal intervention must be constructed with that recognition in mind. This 
is the progressive story of penal history. 
The first few pages of Discipline and Punish do little to undermine that story. 
Foucault recounts the story of an attempted regicide named Damiens that took place in 
1757. The spectacle is nothing short of being morbid and gruesome. It involves burning 
and peeling skin from the offender, drawing and quartering, slicing limbs , all in order that 
would seek to cause the maximum amount of pain. This account is immediately followed 
by one that could provide a contrast. It is a prison schedule from eighty years later. It 
describes in a detached fashion the mundane routine to be followed by the inmates of a 
prison for youth offenders, offering a rigorous, minutely detailed account of what is to be 
expected of them at each hour of the day.58 
It is easy to see here the received view of penal history at work; the public torture 
and humiliation of the procedure applied in contrast to the regimentation of the penal 
practice that follows it. Foucault‟s placing of these two approaches side by side shows 
that he recognizes that there is something to the received view. But it is also misleading. 
That is where his exposition of genealogical history begins. 
Criminals are tortured and degraded before the reforms of the late eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth centuries. In fact, torture occurs at two points in the criminal 
procedure, one secretly and the other publicly. The first is during interrogation. In order 
to obtain confessions, pain is inflicted on the suspect‟s body. This may ring false to 
modern ears (except probably in the case of Guantanamo Bay prisoners or other similar 
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facilities in the post 9-11 world), where a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
However, during the classical period, guilt occurs by degrees, “Thus a semi-proof did not 
leave the suspect innocent until such time as it was completed; it made him semi-guilty; 
slighted evidence of a serious crime marked someone as slightly criminal.”59 A suspect 
then is always deserving of torture. 
It is during punishment that the criminal‟s body is subject to pain and becomes 
public. In France the procedure is called supplice, which translates into English as 
torture. Supplice is a calculated and measured response to criminality, it has three 
elements: the infliction of a measured amount of pain; the regulation of that pain; and the 
ritualistic character of the application of the techniques producing pain.  It is a 
choreographed public ritual of agony. Criminality is often thought of, among other ways, 
as an offense against the social body. This is as true of earlier periods as it is now. 
However the character of the social body in, for instance, pre-Revolution France is 
different.  It is not the people but the sovereign king, who is considered the bearer of the 
elements of the social body, whereas in democratic regimes (at least in principle) the 
people are thought to be the constituents of the social body. The criminal getting away 
with an attack shows the vulnerability of the social body. The punishment of the crime, 
then must involve an assertion of the power of the sovereign. Criminals must be made to 
feel that power at the same site at which they sought to attack the sovereign. They must 
be made to feel it in their body. Producing elaborate tortures that maximize pains and 
assert the unassailable power of the sovereign in a way that is unmistakable both to 
criminals and to the people alike (as a sort of deterrent). As the criminal is taught a 
lesson in power, the people are both restored to their (sense of) security and is warned 
against violating that sovereignty themselves. “The public execution,” Foucault says, 
“has a juridico-political function. It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured 
sovereign is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most 
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spectacular.”60 Punishments cannot be a blind rage because it remains to be an 
expression of the sovereign, and thus must bear the stamp both his power and his 
bearing, that is why punishments are supposed to be controlled. 
There are potential difficulties with this exercise of the power to punish. The first 
is that the grand open display of this asymmetry of power can backfire. Alongside the 
public awe at the power of the king, and alongside the fear it invokes, it can also happen 
that the public comes to identify with the object of punishment, for example the public 
views the punishment as unjust, the public then becomes resentful of the sovereign. In 
addition, criminality represents a rebellion against the current social order, a rebellion 
that sometimes would find sympathy. The cure for all this, it would seem, is to soften the 
punishment, to make less of an expression of power and make it more of an expression 
of justice.  
And indeed there is a reform movement that seeks to soften punishment, and 
even more. A number of changes took place during the second half of the eighteenth 
century: 
 The shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of 
fraud forms part of a whole complex mechanism, embracing 
the development of production, the increase of wealth, a 
higher juridical and moral value placed on property relations, 
stricter methods of surveillance, a tighter petitioning of the 
population, more efficient techniques of locating and 
obtaining information.61 
 
Because of these changes, and in particular because of the change of property relations 
to which many of these relate, another concern surfaced as well. 
 Although punishment is as sporadic as it is gruesome, many people do not get 
caught, and this is another difficulty. The arrangement was acceptable, as long as the 
institution of private property is in its infancy. But as it matures, a necessity of a more 
universal form of punishment grows with it. All property must be protected, and since 
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property is dispersed among individuals, protection from criminality must be given to all 
of them: 
The true objective of the reform movement, even in 
its more general formulations, was not so much to establish 
a new right to punish based on more equitable principles, as 
to set up a new „economy‟ of the power to punish…so that it 
should be distributed in homogenous circuits capable of 
operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to finest 
grain of the social body.62 
 
 The question now is: How can one construct a penal structure that will protect 
against all the petty crimes that have once been tacitly tolerated, while at the same time 
generate a universal respect? The answer is to design punishments that are calibrated to 
crimes so as to ensure deterrence. “To find the suitable punishment for a crime is to find 
the disadvantage whose idea is such that it robs for ever the idea of a crime of any 
attraction.”63 In addition, with this mechanism in place, the populace is less likely to 
become upset with the authorities. A sober system of measured punishments is what is 
needed to eliminate crime, particularly crime against property to ensure public order, and 
for it to be universally applicable.  
The subtitle of Discipline and Punish is the birth of prison. This is where 
Foucault‟s genealogy emerges. Up to this point, it would seem as Foucault is telling a 
linear story that traces a singular thread through its chronological weave. This is not how 
Foucault approaches the birth of prison. There is a certain continuity between earlier and 
later forms of punishments, both of which, after all, are ways of dealing with criminality. 
Moreover, both involve application of particular techniques to the body. However, the 
later form of punishment which Foucault calls discipline, is not merely a development 
from an insular history of punishment. The emergence of the prison is in direct 
contradiction to the idea of the reformers. Rather than matching punishments to crime, it 
affords a single punishment for all crimes.  
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 To account for this emergence Foucault looks beyond the prison to other, 
seemingly more far-flung practices: 
The invention of this new political anatomy must not 
be seen as a sudden discovery. It is often a multiplicity of 
minor processes of different origins and scattered locations, 
which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one 
another, distinguish themselves from one another according 
to their domain of application, converge and gradually 
produce the blueprint of a general method.64 
 
Among these minor processes are the regimented time schedules characteristics of the 
monastery and the precisely calibrated movements that are taught to the soldiers of the 
Prussian army. These and other practices gradually converge on the issue of 
punishment, and over the course provided the “blueprint of a general method” of 
discipline. 
 Discipline, as Foucault uses the term, is more specific than simply the control of 
the behavior of others. It may be defined as the project for the body‟s optimization, for 
turning the body into a well-regulated machine by means of breaking down its 
movements into their smallest elements and then building them back into an efficient 
whole. This project does not simply concern individuals. It also concerns their relations. 
Discipline must ensure that space is properly partitioned so that individuals can relate to 
one another in efficient ways. It must ensure the proper time coordination among 
activities as well as within them. It is a process that is applied both to the bodies and to 
the interaction between them. The ability to accomplish this requires an enclosed area in 
which the movements of individuals and the partitioned space of their relations can be 
monitored and intervened upon. That is what a prison is. 
 If discipline sounds like training for factory work, it should. It is also how schools 
run: break down what is to be learned into manageable segments, and then have 
students master each segment before moving on. It is how businesses, hospitals are 
run, it is how athletics is taught, and how we run our lives. As Foucault asks, “ Is it 
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surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all 
resembles prisons?65 
 Foucault isolates three aspect of disciplinary training: hierarchal observation, 
normalizing judgment, and examination.  
Hierarchal observation involves a certain “economy of the gaze”. There are 
observers and observed. The observer monitors the observed from a hierarchal distance 
so that the observer sees but is not seen by the observed. This way the observer can 
see what the observed is doing, what they are not doing, and how well or poorly are they 
doing it.  For their part, the observed, since they are continuously monitored, become 
subject to the gaze of the observer. They must always be “on”.  
 Normalizing judgment is an operation that works by means of both conformity 
and individualization. Conformity is to the norm itself, the standard by which each must 
strive to meet. These interventions are trained upon minute elements of a person‟s 
behavior.  They bear at very specific points in the behavioral fashioning of any activity, 
seeking to maximize through rewards, punishments, or any other types of motivation.  
 The emergence of normalization is a revolution not only in the penal reform but 
also in the conception and character of who we are. Foucault describes normalizing 
judgments as directly opposed to earlier approaches to punishment, which operate “not 
by hierarchizing, but by simply bringing into play the binary opposition of the permitted 
and the forbidden; not by homogenizing, but by operating the division, acquired once and 
for all, of condemnation.”66 In the earlier forms of punishment, one does not worry about 
where one stands in relation to the norm. The reason for this is that there is no norm. 
There are acts that are forbidden, and others (the rest) that are permitted. 
 Contrast that with our more normalized society. Everyone in our society wonder 
whether their behavior is normal? In older forms of punishment, the binary opposition of 
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the permitted and the forbidden leaves one side of that division alone. In a society 
obsessed to normalization, no behavior is immune to scrutiny.   
We now see at work one of the concepts for which Foucault has become famous 
(and at times notorious): power-knowledge, which is probably the most often 
misunderstood concept in his corpus.67 The concept of power-knowledge denies that one 
can hold knowledge to be divorced from power, that one can partition off all the relations 
of power in which people are involved in order to achieve a knowledge cleansed of 
political impurities, simply a neutral ground. “Perhaps,” Foucault says, “we should 
abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where 
the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its 
injunctions, its demands, and its interest”. 68 
 This does not mean that all knowledge is reducible to power relations or that 
knowledge is simply a mask for “power‟. That would not be power-knowledge; it would 
just be power. Instead, we should think of knowledge as something that is embedded in 
or inseparable from power relations, but still is a form of knowledge. In fact following 
Foucault‟s stand, the emergence of knowledge and its object can occur at the same 
time. To put the point in another way, power does not only stop things from happening. It 
is not merely a negative or repressive operation. It also creates things. Foucault says: 
These “power-knowledge” relations are to be 
analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of 
knowledge who is or who is not free in relation to the power 
system, but on the contrary, the subject who knows, the 
objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must 
be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental 
implications of power knowledge and their historical 
transformations.69 
  
In addition to hierarchal observation and normalizing judgment, discipline 
involves another element: examination. We have all been subject to it, whether in school, 
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during job training or in a hospital. The examination forms an element of the feedback 
loop of discipline. It marks out where each of us stands relative to the standard or the 
norm, to which we are measured.  If hierarchal observations seeks to maximize 
efficiency by overseeing activity, examination provides the feedback necessary to 
recognize the degree to which that efficiency has been internalized, the degree to which 
it has become part of us or has become a part of who we are now. 
  Foucault sums up the elements of discipline and their operation in the arresting 
image of Jeremy Bentham‟s Panopticon. Bentham offers in 1791 a design of a prison 
that he calls the Panopticon. Essentially, the Panopticon is constructed like a ring around 
a central core. The ring holds the prisoners, the central core, the guards. The prison is 
constructed so the guards can look out and see inside all the prison cells. The prisoners 
however, cannot see into the central core. Therefore, although one cannot watch all the 
prisoners at once, no prisoner can see who is being observed and who is not. One must 
act as though one is always being observed, since at any particular moment one might 
be. In the Panopticon, since one cannot see the guards, and since one must assume 
that one is being watched all the time, they do not actually have to be any guards at the 
central core. The prisoners, in essence, guard themselves. They act as though they are 
under surveillance even if there is nobody there to observe them. And that, Foucault 
concludes, is our condition. Given the suffusion of discipline across broad swaths of our 
society, we are in a condition of what he calls “panopticism”. Even if there is no one 
watching us, even if we are not being monitored, we act as though we are. We seek to 
be “normal” because we are our own prison guards. We have internalized the norm and 
act in accordance to it, most of the times blindly. 
 Admittedly, there might be some continuities between penal discipline and the 
earlier forms of punishment, in particular, both had to do with penality and both are 
focused on the body. The later forms though, although continuous in one sense, is far 
removed from the earlier version in another sense. Penality is no longer a project of 
punishment nor is it a project of deterrence. It transformed itself into a project of 
normalization, or what penal theorists call rehabilitation. Instead of torture there is 
discipline. 
 The role of the body has changed as well. It has changed from being a site of 
pain to being a site of normalization. The body is where our psychological state; our 
normalization is created. Foucault even calls his study of prison, “an element in a 
genealogy of the modern „soul‟‟.70 The modern soul is the psychological soul, one whose 
moral components is embodied in a logic of the normal and the abnormal. We are in 
obsessed to this modern soul, not because it is imposed on us, but because, at this 
particular time in our history, it is who we are. Or better, since there is nothing that solely 
is who we are, it is, as Foucault says, “an element” of who we are: a centrally important 
one. And because we are held in thrall to it, and because it is one of the crucial sources 
of our conformity, it is no surprise when Foucault, inverting the old Christian formula, 
declares that the “soul is the prison of the body”.71 
 Many might point out that the prison, as a project of rehabilitation is a failure. 
Recidivism rates are high, many prisoners consider the therapeutic aspects of prison a 
joke, and as seen on many cases many projects of psychological therapy have at best 
uneven success in changing attitudes or behavior. The prison as a site of discipline has 
not created the kind of environment in which discipline can take hold. Foucault does not 
deny the failure of the prison. What he seeks to understand is its continuance in the face 
of its failure. There must, he believes, be some function that prisons continue to serve if 
demonstrated failure is not enough to dismantle them. In fact he proposes that there are 
two. One concerns the prisoners themselves and the second one society at large. 
 Regarding prisoners, the prison becomes part of an entire system where certain 
criminals who cannot be rehabilitated can at least be monitored. Prisons, parole officers, 
police, informants; all of these become relays in a larger system of surveillance where 
criminality can be overseen, at times even utilized, when it cannot be eliminated. The 
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effects of the prison on society at large are perhaps more important. It is not simply the 
prison itself, but the larger “carceral archipelago”72, composed of social workers, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, personnel counselors, judges, the legal system, family 
doctors and others which it is a necessary part. The carceral archipelago generates 
important effects on the texture of our society. Near the end of Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault isolates six of those effects.  
The carceral archipelago blurs the line between the legal and illegal, allowing for 
continuous disciplinary intervention. It can recruit the delinquents it creates in order to 
monitor crime or the deviancy from the norm. It makes the idea of punishment itself 
seem natural or inevitable, particularly since it is done without violence but instead by 
means of softer disciplinary procedures. It allows the proliferations of procedures of 
examination and normalization throughout society. It reinforces the importance of the 
prison itself, regardless of its failure, as the ultimate and often most threatening site of 
disciplinary intervention. In short, the carceral archipelago, of which the prison is a 
central element, sustains the disciplinary character of society even when it cannot 
accomplish the disciplinary project of rehabilitating criminals.        
 Discipline and Punish has lots of novel philosophical contributions. It managed to 
question a progressive view of history without embracing a regressive one. It inverted the 
traditional Christian-inspired view that the body is the prison of the soul. It subjects 
aspects of ourselves that we might have thought to be immutable to a contingent history. 
It places knowledge in the context of politics. These changes are not isolated from one 
another. For example, if there are aspects of who we are that are matters of historical 
change rather than being immutable, and if that historical change is contingent, then our 
history cannot be one of necessary progress or regress. Or again, if knowledge is a 
matter of politics then the Christian heritage of the privileging, of the soul over the body 
can come into question, not only epistemologically but also politically. 
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 Underlying all of these contributions is another one. Utilized in Discipline and 
Punish, and explained in the first volume of his History of Sexuality, is a new view of the 
operation of power. It is not that all of these other changes are reducible to this new view 
of power. Instead, it is that they all appeal to it; moreover, it gives each of them a force 
they would lack without it.  
 Traditionally, power had been associated with the negative capacity to deny or 
forbid. In spatial terms, it stood at the apex of a vertical axis. This view suited our modern 
conception of political sovereignty as a top-down phenomenon. Power reputedly 
consisted of a relationship between sovereign and subjects. It bespoke the capacity of 
rulers to censure or to control the behavior of those they ruled. For example, in the 
Social Contract, individuals give up certain parts of their freedom to the state. In this way, 
the state becomes powerful. It intervenes in people‟s lives in order to prevent them from 
doing all sorts of things. There must be then, checks placed upon the state, to prevent 
the state from overstepping its bounds. It can be an internal, or external check or a 
combination of both. However for these checks to work, they must allow individuals to be 
able to conduct their lives with the protection and support of, but not the undue 
interference of the state.    
 This brief (and admittedly oversimplified) sketch of liberal political philosophy is 
meant to shed light to two related themes that characterize that philosophy: the centrality 
of the state and the negative view of power. These two themes seem to lean upon each 
other. Power is what states have that can interfere with the ability of individuals to carry 
out their lives. If we look at the state from the standpoint of negative or repressive power, 
we are likely to see something monolithic that needs to be curbed so that it does not 
become tyrannical.  
I have to be clear here, Foucault does not deny that there is repressive power or 
that the state has possesses it. Rather it is to say that often the more effective forms of 
power come from below rather than above, from our practices rather from the state. It is 
also to say that a more effective power operates by creating objects rather than 
repressing them. 
 I should emphasize here, that the emergence of this form of power is itself a 
historical matter. It relies on more advanced technologies of communication, more 
dominant population centers such as cities, the rise of medical and related health 
sciences, and greater economic integration: 
If it is true that the juridical system [the binary system 
of the permitted and the forbidden with its repressive view of 
power] was useful for representing, albeit in a non-
exhaustive way, a power that was centered primarily around 
deduction [prelevement] and death, it is utterly incongruous 
with the new methods of power whose operation is not 
ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by 
normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods 
that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond 
the state and its apparatus.73        
   
If the creative forms of power is, at one time, marginal, they are now central in the 
practices we engage in and through which we become who we are, who we are now.      
 But what does Foucault mean by power, and how does it work? The first question 
is one that Foucault mostly avoids. He does not want to give us a theory of power but 
rather he offers a description of its operation in particular historical situations. 
Nevertheless, using the term as centrally as he does, he must have something in his 
mind.74 In an essay entitled “The Subject and Power”, he does offer a tentative definition 
of power: 
In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that 
it is a mode of action which does not act directly and 
immediately on others. Instead it acts upon an action, on 
existing actions or on those which may arise in the present 
or the future.75       
 
 Foucault contrasts power and violence. Violence forces a body to do something; 
it compels without the possibility of resistance. Power on the other hand, woks by 
                                                 
73
 Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, R. Hurley (trans.) New 
York: Random House, 1978. 
74
 We can only surmise. Up to now his definition of power has been interpreted and re-interpreted 
by various scholars. 
75
 Foucault, Michel, “The Subject and Power”, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, 208-26, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
influence instead of violence. It works not by restraint (negative view) but by inducing 
something to happen (Foucault‟s view). Foucault says, “Power is exercised only over 
free subjects, and only insofar as they are free”.76 Power works by taking an open field of 
possible actions and constructing certain ways of actions that are more likely to be taken. 
Normalization, for example, does not work by violence upon the body. Instead, by 
observing and examining a body it leads it to become more efficient. 
 There is a similarity between this definition of power and the historical 
contingency to which Foucault is committed. If power works by influencing or by inducing 
a free body rather than by force, then its hold is more fragile than we might otherwise 
think. Although normalization is deeply embedded in our conception of who we are, it 
does so only by means of its influence and by it being rooted in so many of our practices. 
There are other ways we can be, ways that can be explored through the construction of 
new practices. Who we are now is but historically contingent. 
 In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault offers what might be his 
theses on power: power is not a possession; power is not exterior to other relations; 
power comes from below; power relations are “intentional and are non-subjective”; power 
always come with resistance.77   
 To think of power as possession is to think in accordance with the traditional view 
of power. It seeks to understand and regulate the entity, it is usually the state, that has 
the most of it. But power can work without belonging to anybody. Actions can constrain 
other actions without anybody‟s possessing the power of that constraint. Those who 
work in the medical field or who teach or who engage in psychotherapy do not have the 
power of discipline over those they monitor or supervise. Normalization is not something 
they impose, but instead it is something in which they participate. 
 To say that power is not exterior to other relations is to generalize the lesson of 
power-knowledge. Let us be careful; as we see with knowledge, to say that other 
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relations are not immune to power is not the same thing as saying that they are all 
reducible to power, that they are “really about” power. Power is interwoven into these 
and other practices in complex ways. If one is to understand the operation of power, it 
requires a patient historical analysis of the way power arises within and across practices, 
not a sweeping generalization about everything being simply a matter of power. 
Power, in the sense Foucault approaches it, is not a possession of the state, a 
matter of the economy, or the expression of some overarching historical theme. It lies in 
the dispersion of everyday practices that are the aether of our lives. It is not a power that 
one possesses over another; rather it is a power that lies in the practices itself, creating 
who we are through our participation in them. Power is everywhere, sure, but this does 
not mean that power is everything. The point that power comes from below; from what 
Foucault sometimes calls the “capillaries”, reinforces that point. 
 Foucault‟s phrase that power relations are “intentional and non-subjective” has 
often been misunderstood. It sounds as though there is a certain goal that power has in 
mind, even if that goal is not the motivation of particular individuals. Foucault‟s choice of 
word may reinforce this view, “There is no power that is exercised without a series of 
aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of 
an individual subject”.78 Power relations themselves do not aim at or seek to achieve 
anything. I think the term “oriented” describes it best. Power relations are “oriented” in 
certain directions. They have regularities that bring about some kinds of behavior and not 
others 
 The idea that “where there is power, there is resistance”79is again an elusive one. 
It can be taken in two different ways. The first would be to claim that, in principle, power 
requires resistance, that there can be no power without resistance. I am uncomfortable 
with this claim. If power is a set of actions upon actions that create objects in the way 
Foucault describes, it is not necessary to think of resistance as an inevitable part of 
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power relations. Since force is not involved, could there not be relations of power that are 
without resistance? There is reason to think otherwise. However, we can try to 
understand this in perhaps a weaker sense. It is not that power requires resistance and 
cannot exist without it, but rather there always seem to be resistance where there are 
relations of power.80Power does not imply resistance, but often is coupled with it.81 This 
seems a much safer if not defensible claim. Justifying it is a matter of turning to the 
historical record. And Foucault did show in Discipline and Punish that various power 
arrangements have been met with resistance, even if those resisting do not know exactly 
what is it they are opposing. In a nutshell we should see power not as merely 
suppressing but more importantly, it creates. Without anyone controlling it, power arises 
in everyday practices, orienting our behavior and our knowledge in particular, historically 
contingent ways. We rarely understand these ways fully, but often try to resist them. And, 
by our participating in these practices, we ourselves become embedded in the relations 
of power, even when we resist them. We become what those relations orient us to 
become, and we pave the way for others to become it as well. To put the point in another 
way, power helps create who we are, or at least who we are now. We can recall 
Foucault‟s earlier statement that we often know what we do and why we are doing it; 
what we do not know is what our “doing it” does. What our doing it does is reinforce 
power relations that elude our cognitive grasp, not because we are distant from them but 
for the opposite reason that they are so much part of who we are. It is the project of a 
genealogy to display those relations before us in their proximity, their complexity, and 
their historical contingency. 
 The first volume of Foucault‟s History of Sexuality sketches another genealogical 
project, this one tied to sex rather than discipline. Although the next (the last two) 
volumes of the History of Sexuality take on a different approach from the one outlined in 
the first volume, the historical sketch Foucault offers there has been as influential as his 
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book on the prisons, in part because it invites a radical reorientation of how we think 
about sex. 
 At the beginning of the book on sexuality, Foucault describes our (then) current 
view of sex under the term the repressive hypothesis. The repressive hypothesis is a 
story about our sexuality. It is a story of sexual awakening. Once we were sexually 
repressed. This sexual repression has perhaps reached its zenith in the Victorian period, 
but has been sustained throughout much of the 20th Century. With the various 
movements for liberation in the 1960‟s,82 the recognition of the need for sexual liberation 
arises. Sexual repression after all is not only bad in itself, it also contributes to the other 
ills including repression of women‟s sexuality, discrimination against homosexuality, a 
general cultural conformism, and the suppression of other desires.  
 Have we really liberated ourselves from our sexual repression? If so, has this 
really led us to other forms of liberation? Foucault, however follows a different take. He 
asks a question that casts doubt on the founding assumptions of these other questions. 
Has there ever been such a thing as sexual repression?  If there hasn‟t, then not only 
could we not have liberated ourselves from it, we cannot wonder what effects this 
liberation might or might not have had.  
 To say that there never was sexual repression, 
however, is not the same thing as saying that there was 
never any discretion in regard to sexual matters. It is quite 
possible that there was an expurgation – and a very rigorous 
one – of the authorized vocabulary. It may be true that a 
whole rhetoric of allusion and metaphor was codified… At 
the level of discourses and their domains, however, 
practically the opposite phenomenon occurred. There was a 
steady proliferation of discourses concerned with sex.83 
 
Discourses on sex in period the previous to ours are discreet, but they are also 
pervasive. 
 How does this concern about sex arise? Foucault finds its roots not in a single 
cause but in the convergence of  (again) disparate concerns. One of them has to do with 
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the Catholic confessional. In the face of the Reformation, the confessional undergoes a 
change. Where previously one confesses forbidden acts, now one must confess not only 
the acts that one commits but also one‟s desires. It is not simply what one does that is 
the object of the confessional; it is what one thinks and wants, especially with regard to 
sex: 
According to the new pastoral, sex must not be 
named imprudently, but its aspects, its correlations, and its 
effects must be pursued down to their slenderest 
ramifications; a shadow in a daydream, an image too slowly 
dispelled, a badly exorcised complicity between the body‟s 
mechanics and the mind‟s complacency; everything had to 
be told.84 
 
 In addition to the changes in the confessional, there is also an economic focus on 
sex. The beginning of an industrial economy raise questions about how populations are 
to be sustained and utilized: 
One of the great innovations in the techniques of 
power in the 18th century was the emergence of “population” 
as an economic and political problem; population as wealth, 
population as manpower or labor capacity; population 
balanced between its own growth and the resources it 
commanded.85 
 
Where there is concern with population, there will also be concern with sex; how it 
happens, what it leads to, and how it should be regulated.  
 There are other sources as well, in biology, medicine, psychology, in pedagogy. 
In schools, for example, although sex is not spoken of, the architecture of dormitories 
displays a greater concern with the partitions, dividing boys and girls. What these various 
sources converge on is sex. Sex as the centerpiece, sex as the object, sex as the secret, 
and ultimately sex as the truth. In direct contrast to the repressive hypothesis, sex is not 
hidden, it has come to light. “What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they 
consigned sex to a shadow existence, but they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad 
infinitum, while exploiting it as the secret.86In this sense, the sexual liberation of the 
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period in which Foucault writes is not a break from the past; it is simply a continuation of 
the concern with sex that has characterized the West for several hundred years.87 
 Sex is our truth; in our sexual desire we discover the secret of who we are and 
the key to proper social regulation. Over the course of past several centuries, sex has 
become one of the keys to answer to the question of who we are. And because power is 
inseparable from knowledge, the investigation of sex is a political as well as an epistemic 
one. That investigation is not only a matter of discovery. It is also a matter of actions 
upon actions that create what is investigated. Both in the empirical and theoretical 
research into sex as well as the individual confession of one‟s desires – to the priest , to 
the psychoanalyst, to the counselor, or to the social worker- one is being studied and 
created. Practices that center on sex create a sexual being or different types of beings 
that are defining themselves by their relation to sex. 
 Foucault suggests four figures that arise from the concern with sex. They are 
elements of the creation, as he puts it, of sexuality out of sex88. These figures are the 
hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the perverse adult and the Malthusian couple.  
The hysterical woman has her roots in the earlier views of sex. The idea of 
hysteria comes from the movement of the womb around the woman‟s body.89 This theme 
is appropriated over the course of 19th century to link women and their nervous 
conditions to sexuality. Sex is the truth of the hysterical woman, who is almost to be 
found in almost all women. 
 The masturbating child is the product of the discovery of the sexual character of 
childhood. The child, once thought to be pre-sexual, is now thought (and feared) to be 
saturated with sexuality from an early age. The question arises of what to do with this 
newly discovered sexual character of children. In one of the published series of lectures 
from Foucault‟s tenure at the College de France, Abnormal, Foucault documents 
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measures used to channel childhood sexuality, measures that find their root in a 
profusion of texts from the middle of the 18th century on the dangers of childhood 
masturbation. In essence, at least for bourgeois families, there emerges a fear of outside 
caretakers as potential sexual abusers, provoking masturbation in children. This leads to 
the privileging of the nuclear family as the necessary condition for healthy childhood 
sexuality, and consequently to the responsibility of the parents for the child‟s sexual 
upbringing. “The child‟s sexuality is the trick by which the close knit, affective, substantial 
and cellular family was constituted and from whose shelter the child was extracted.”90 
 The perverse adult is best exemplified by the homosexual. Homosexuals are 
defined – and to this day remain defined - by their sexuality. It is the key to who they are. 
It means that homosexuals, as people, are defined by their sexuality. Who they are can 
be discovered through an investigation of their sexual desires. As Foucault sums it up: 
…the sexual instinct was isolated as a separate 
biological and psychical instinct; a clinical analysis was 
made of all the forms of anomalies by which it could be 
afflicted ; it was assigned a role of normalization or 
pathologization with respect to all behavior; and finally, a 
corrective technology was sought for these anomalies.91 
 
The perverse adult is the person defined by a warping of sexual desire. That warping 
fulfills two roles. First, it warrants intervention by various psychological and social 
agencies. Secondly, since this warping is a possibility that can happen to all sexual 
desire, it stands as a possibility for each of us. We must therefore be protected, not only 
against perverse adults themselves, but also against the perverse adult that lies within 
each of us.  
 Finally, there is the Malthusian couple. This is the couple that is ideal relative to 
the social and economic needs of society. It is a product of population analysis and 
psychosexual research. We might say, in the terms introduced in Discipline and Punish, 
that the Malthusian couple is the norm against which all existing families are compared. 
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And since nobody92 achieves perfect normality, the Malthusian couple becomes the 
justification for intervention into people‟s sexual lives. We all exist both in the shadow of 
and at a distance from the ideal of the Malthusian couple, which in turn provides both an 
ideal for us to achieve and the excuse from outside institutions to monitor and control our 
sexual lives.93 
 In the final chapter of the first volume of the history of sexuality, Foucault 
suggests that the sexuality that emerges over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries is 
part of a larger configuration that he terms bio-politics.  
Bio-politics is a politics of living that concerns itself with how to promote and 
intervene in human life. It replaces the earlier concern with simply allowing one to live 
with an active intervention into the character and state of one‟s living. “One might say 
that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or 
disallow it to the point of death”.94We must be clear here that the power that replaces the 
ancient right does not belong solely or even primarily to the state. It arises as power 
relations that come from dispersed sources and converge in a fluid (and shifting) unity.
 With the concept of bio-politics, Foucault returns to and integrates his earlier 
treatment of discipline. He suggests that discipline may be one of the twin poles of the 
constitution of bio-politics; 
…starting in the 17th century, this power over life 
evolved in two basic forms…One of these poles…was 
ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the 
disciplines; an anatamo-politics of the human body. The 
second, somewhat later, focused on the species body, the 
body imbued with the mechanism of life and serving as the 
basis of the biological processes…Their supervision was 
effected through an entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population.95 
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Discipline and population; the individual body and the collective group. These are the 
poles of bio-politics. What do the body and population have in common? His answer: 
Sexuality. 
 Sexuality can then be read back into some of the concerns developed in the 
earlier book on prisons. This does not make earlier book mistaken, that the issue really is 
sex, not discipline. The suggestion rather is that the concern with sex brings a new 
dimension to the disciplinary interventions described in the earlier text. There is an 
overlap between the two: the focus on normality and normalization, the concern with the 
person‟s interiority, the connection with psychological and psychiatric practice.  
During this period of his writing, Foucault often says that his concern is with what 
he calls in a play of words, subjectification or subjectivation: the creation of particular 
kinds of subjectivity through the subjection to various practices of power-knowledge. 
What the books on discipline and sex accomplish is to describe, from two different but 
convergent angles, the emergence of modern subjectivity.96  
Comparing both Archeology and Genealogy, both sets of works operate at the 
level of social practices rather than the individual‟s creation of themselves, the 
genealogical works differ by showing how this collective constitution arises on an 
everyday level. Because the genealogical works are less abstracted from our daily lives, 
they show how a we97 arises. Not by imposition from institutions or forces above us, but 
from below, from our everyday practices, where we live. 
 Archeological works, although recognizing relations between the discursive and 
non-discursive elements of an archive, seem to privilege the former. This privilege 
disappears in the genealogical works, in part because the distinction between the 
discursive and the non-discursive itself disappears. Since Foucault is now concerned 
less with the archives of theoretical discourses, and more with how particular discourses 
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of knowledge arise within concrete social practices, the issue shifted. It is no longer a 
matter of the relation of the discursive to the non-discursive. It is now how one‟s 
practices create forms of knowledge. When one discusses a practice, one does not need 
to draw sharp distinctions between the discursive and the non-discursive elements, 
because at the level of a practice, they are entwined. 
 Our knowledge creates who we are, and who we are in our relationships of power 
helps to create our knowledge. Genealogy‟s focus on practices, as well as the 
introduction of power-knowledge, creates a type of analysis that makes the discursive 
and the non-discursive inseparable. At the same time, because these practices are 
social, they form the collective character of who we are. 
 This collective and politically charged character of who we are is at once 
historically contingent and something we cannot just shake off. The historical 
contingency is as strong here as it is in the archeological works, but for a different 
reason. In the earlier writings, the fragility of our history is displayed in the breaks and 
discontinuities it contains. Different archives are governed by different rules and norms, 
and there is often shift from one archive to another. In the genealogical works it‟s not so 
much the discontinuities that matter – although they are there – but rather the shifting 
and changing character of the practices themselves as well as their complex interplay 
with one another. 
 There is no necessary reason that sex should become so important to who we 
are now, anymore than breathing and eating. The intersection of a changed Catholic 
confessional and the rise of population studies, for example, cannot be ascribed to an 
underlying movement of history that they both reflect. The Reformation does not have to 
take place in the way and at the time it does, and even if it had to, Catholicism does not 
need to respond to it by focusing the confessional on sexual desires rather than 
forbidden acts. At the same time, the rise of capitalism does not require the emergence 
and importance of population studies.  
 History may seem to have a necessary shape or pattern. However, when one 
begins to look at the complexity of our actual practices, when one approaches our lives 
at ground level, the contingency of those practices‟ emergence and interaction becomes 
more visible. At the same time the unities that emerge through the contingent threads of 
history, although fragile as they are, cannot simply be shaken off.  
In the archeological histories the fact that action takes place in an archive means 
that actions are framed by their historical circumstances. The genealogical works are no 
different in this regard. However, by introducing the concept of power, Foucault‟s 
genealogies are more explicit about the constraining nature of our practices. Actions that 
affect other actions are actions that we cannot simply shake off.  
 This does not imply that we are helpless before our historical constitution, that we 
are nothing more but prisoners of power relationships. I‟ve pointed out earlier that the 
claim that power is everywhere does not imply that it is everything. One of the challenges 
in understanding Foucault‟s work is that of thinking of contingency and constraint 
together. Our intellectual legacy largely provides us with two options: either we are free 
or we are determined. Foucault does not give us a solution to the philosophical problem 
of free will and determinism. His approach implies a different orientation to the issue of 
constraint.  
 Genealogy leaves the ambiguity of archeology‟s relation to complexity behind. 
Foucault‟s archeological studies trace the rules and norms of particular archives. This 
leaves open the question of how general the archive is. This is not so with genealogy. 
Although there are times when Foucault may seem to suggest a reduction of cultural 
complexity to single themes, a careful reading shows that each book treats an aspect of 
how we have come to be who we are now, not the entirety of it. Are we disciplinary 
beings? Yes. Are we sexual beings? Yes. Is there a relationship between these two? 
Yes. Are they reducible to each other or to a third unity that encompasses them both? 
No.  
 The archeologies are haunted by a question of reflexivity, a question having to do 
with their epistemological status. The question can be this way: if all knowledge takes 
place in an archive does this not also apply to Foucault‟s archeologies, and if so, does 
that not somehow undermine their claims? However it is not a question genealogy must 
confront. The reason for this has to do with genealogy‟s relation to complexity. If there 
are many different and irreducible practices in which we are, or could be, engaged, we 
can count genealogy as one of them. Genealogy has its own norms and power relations, 
but this does not necessarily undermine the historical claims it makes.  
 Recalling how genealogy operates in the critique of psychology that rises in the 
book of prisons; Foucault does not criticize psychological knowledge for being false. In 
fact, part of its truth lies in the fact that it contributes to creating what it studies. The 
problem with psychological knowledge lies in its effects, not in its truth: but in the political 
character that it creates rather than the epistemic character of its claims. With 
genealogy, then, if we were to ask genealogical questions about its claims, if we were to 
do a genealogy of genealogy we would trace the emergence and descent of that 
genealogy, asking where it comes from and what the endorsement of it leads to. There is 
no bar to doing this, as long as one is willing to do the grunt work. One must show it: one 
must investigate the history itself.  
Foucault gives us a caveat with his own history of sexuality: he does not yet know 
whether, “beyond these few phosophorescences”, he will discover that the repressive 
hypothesis is indeed correct. It will require historical research to determine. The same 
goes with genealogy. Genealogy, then, does not face the problem of reflexivity that 
haunts archeology because it does not reduce knowledge to a particular archive and 
because it does not claim that the objects of its critique are false. It is open to critique 
itself; but that critique must be shown, not just claimed. A critique of Foucauldian 




Using Foucault: Constructing a Filipino Identity 
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary 
nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on 
which power comes to fasten or which it happens to strike, and 
in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already 
one of the prime effect of power of certain bodies, certain 
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be 
identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, 
is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime 
effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same 
time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the 
element of its articulation. The individual which power has 
constituted is at the same time its vehicle  – Michel Foucault98 
 
Constructing an Identity: Self-Fashioning as Key 
The first volume of the History of Sexuality raises the point that sexuality, as the 
placement of sexual desire at the center of who one is, has evolved over recent 
centuries. Sexuality is not an eternal phenomenon. By returning to ancient Greece and 
Rome, Foucault showed us a period in which sex is conceived differently from the way it 
is now. It is more integrated into other aspects of living. Instead of holding the secret to 
who we are, sex is a part of one‟s living. For the ancients, it is an aspect that is to be 
taken up into the larger project of taking care of oneself. 
 In Foucault‟s previous works, he traces aspects of the history of how we have 
come to be who we are now. He starts with historical periods before our own in order to 
show, in the archeological works, the breaks that have taken place and, in the 
genealogical works, the accidental emergence of our own situation from a very different 
one. We can say that the history that he recounts allows him to do two things, one is to 
realize the contingency of historical emergence and that people can conceive the world 
very differently from the way we do now. Or to put it simply that history did not have to 
take the path it has taken. 
 If we do not have to see the things the way we once did, if we do not have to be 
who we once were, then we do not have to be who we are now. By bringing up the 
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possibility of different ways of being allows us not only to see the contingency of our own 
historically given ways of being, but it also allows us to feel it. Being brought into the 
presence of another way of living, getting the sense of its themes, its parameters, its 
concerns, allows us to understand more instinctively that there are other ways to live 
than our own. This does not mean we have to embrace those other ways. But they help 
loosen the grip of “naturalness” that the present has upon us. 
 The loosening of the grip is evidenced in the latter two volumes on sexuality. If 
their goal is to permit our straying a field of ourselves, then seeing how we could have 
lived otherwise is a tool in this permission. One must be clear though that Foucault, in 
the latter two volumes, does not offer models for our own living. It is sometimes thought 
that the sympathy with which he writes, particularly of Greek sexuality, implies that he 
wants us to return to it. I can only suspect that this view arises largely because of the 
intersection of Foucault‟s homosexuality with the Greek‟s tolerance for it. Whether it is 
true or not does not diminish the importance of his work in Philosophy. 
 I have consistently raised the claim throughout this thesis that the question that 
occupies Foucault‟s thought is the question of who we are now. In presenting us different 
ways of seeing and living very different from our own, however, he changes the question. 
The Greeks and the Romans are not who we are now. Moreover, Foucault emphasizes 
in his later studies not their legacy (which historians do so often) but their differences 
from us. It is not how the specific practices of the Greeks and Romans converge with 
other practices in order to form who we are that matters rather it is how distant they are 
from our practices that is at issue. 
 This relocation of focus has an impact on the question of who we are. At first 
glance, we might say that it shifts the concern from who we are now to who we once 
were. But that is not the whole picture. As Foucault tells us, he is not simply interested in 
knowing who we were. His research is never simply an academic exercise. The stakes 
here concern freedom; they concern straying afield of ourselves. “ The object was to 
learn to what extent the effort to think one‟s own history can free thought from what is 
silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.”99 So the shift is not the simple one 
from who we are to who we were. It is better represented this way: it is from who we are 
now to who we might be. I must be careful with this though; who we might be is not 
provided directly by the model of the ancients. Although there will be themes in the 
ancient approach to living that Foucault endorse, particularly the idea of the care of the 
self as an aesthetics of existence, the ancients do not provide us with a concrete 
alternative. Rather, studying them loosens the grip our present has upon us. It allows us 
not only to conceive but imaginatively to inhabit a different way of living. It opens the 
door to our asking the question of who we might be. 
 Alongside these changes are a number of continuities with his earlier works. 
Foucault‟s attention remains focused on practices, on the structured forms of daily living. 
If he writes about philosophers like Seneca or Plato, it is with different orientation from 
the one the history of philosophy has passed down to us. He is not interested in the 
ancients as theorists; he is interested in them as practitioners of what might be called 
true living. To live rightly, to live according to proper truths, is the task of ancient 
philosophers, rather than one of simply discovering the truth. In this he Foucault follows 
his contemporary, the philosopher of antiquity Pierre Hadot. But he also remains faithful 
to his earlier genealogical orientation of looking on the ground, at the practices that make 
up life, rather than shifting to a more purely theoretical plane. 
 If looking backwards from our perspective, we see philosophy as a matter of 
discovering truths rather than orienting ourselves towards the proper care of the self, this 
is because we have lost the ancient approach to philosophy, and with it the 
understanding of what ancient philosophers were doing. In his lecture series of 1981-82, 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault says, 
“…the more serious reason why this precept of the 
care of the self has been forgotten, the reason why the place 
occupied by this precept in ancient culture for nigh on one 
thousand years has been obliterated, is what I will call… the 
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“Cartesian moment.” … It came into play into ways: by 
philosophically requalifying the gnothi seauton (know 
yourself) and by discrediting the epimeleia heautou (care of 
the self).”100 
 
Although the care of the self dropped out of philosophical discourse, knowing oneself, 
which had been oriented towards the care of the self, became a matter of determining 
the conditions of a person‟s access to truth. Instead of maintaining itself as what 
Foucault sometimes calls a spiritual project, philosophical practice slowly transformed 
itself into an epistemological one. 
 What then is the care of the self? Foucault‟s most sustained treatment of this 
concept is in the recently published lectures from which the above quote is drawn. In 
those lectures, Foucault traces the change in orientation of the care of the self from Plato 
through Hellenic thought, especially that of the Stoics and the Epicureans. What 
underlies Foucault‟s concern is the relation of what he calls the subject and truth. 
 This relation of truth and subject is a lens through which we (arguably) can read 
the entirety of Foucault‟s writings. The archeological work is a matter of the subject‟s 
epistemic placement in an archive. By placing the subject of knowledge in an archive, 
Foucault rejects the phenomenological tradition that he was brought up in and that his 
earliest writings sustain. In phenomenology, the subject‟s relation to truth is more 
immediate. It is a matter of being able to see almost in the sense of Descartes‟ clear and 
distinct perception, what needs to be grasped. The inference of history, politics, or 
language can all be overcomed according to the phenomenological view. However, if 
knowledge is inescapably located within the rules and norms of an archive, if it is always 
historically bounded, then the possibility of a subject‟s immediate relation to truth is lost. 
The relation of subject to truth runs through the archive. 
 Genealogy maintains the same rejection of phenomenology, and adds a political 
dimension to the historical one. What one knows is not a matter of a pure seeing or 
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grasping; rather, it concerns a series of political relationships in which truth- or at least 
claims to truth – is embedded. 
 Of course, Foucault‟s concern has never been with all areas of truth. The truth 
that concerns him has to do with what he calls the „human sciences”. Psychology, 
linguistics, economics, medicine, psychoanalysis, biology: these are the areas of truth 
that form Foucault‟s target. We might say that it is not a matter of subject‟s relation to 
truth, but their relation to their own truth that lies at the center of Foucault‟s interest. The 
issue is the subject’s relation to who they are, or to who they are now, and, as a part of 
this, to who they take themselves to be.  
 The care of the self involves a different relation of the subject to its own truth. The 
care of the self, whether Platonic, Hellenistic, or early Christian, requires one to work on 
oneself in a way that transforms who one is. It is not simply truth but oneself that is at 
stake. And in particular, with Hellenistic thought, the care of the self involves a lifelong 
commitment to self-creation, to getting free of who one is so that one can become 
something else. 
Knowledge of the self, at this level at least, is not then on the way to becoming 
the decipherment of the mysteries of conscience and the explanation of the self which 
developed in later Christianity. Useful knowledge or knowledge in which human life is at 
stake, is a relational mode of knowledge that asserts and prescribes at the same time 
and is capable of producing a change in the subject‟s mode of being.101 
Comparing this idea with Foucault‟s own project of philosophy of allowing one to 
stray afield oneself, the importance of the care of the self becomes evident. In both 
cases, the relation of subject to truth is not epistemological; it is practical. Practical not in 
the sense of Kant‟s moral law, nor in the everyday sense of navigating one‟s world 
smoothly, in many ways, it is the opposite of the latter sense of the practical. The care of 
the self requires one to throw away one‟s normal relation to the practical world in favor of 
one that fails to conform to the expectations of that world. 
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 The care of the self and Foucault‟s straying afield are practical because they are 
both matters of practice, in two senses of the word. First, they are matters of how one 
relates to and engages in the social practices of which one is a part. They are not merely 
projects of thought; they are projects of living. Secondly, to take care of oneself or to 
stray afield of oneself requires practice. It requires a vigilant attention to who one is being 
made to be by the society around one, and an often renewed commitment to become 
otherwise. Caring for oneself and straying afield of oneself are not simply products of a 
single epiphany. They require constant practice and renewed commitment. 
 If the relation of subject to truth is in some ways common to both Foucault and 
the ancients, so is the goal of philosophical practice. It is, in both cases, a certain 
freedom, a freedom that involves abandoning some of the norms that govern the society 
in which one finds oneself in favor of a vision of a better way of living. 
 However we should not interpret Foucault‟s project as identical to that of the 
Stoics, or of the ancients generally. There are important marked differences between 
Foucault‟s idea and that of the ancient philosophers, particularly regarding the character 
of the freedom one seeks to exercise. Among the most important is that for the ancients, 
there are proper ways to live, and the care of the self is required in order to achieve 
them. Foucault writes in a much later period, one in which the idea of essentially proper 
ways to live is foreign to many, and certainly to him. So the care of the self is differently 
oriented.  It is not in the service of a right way of living, a way of living that would, for the 
ancients, be inscribed in the larger cosmic order. Rather, it serves of bringing reflective 
thought to bear on one might make of oneself.  
 In the lectures on the care of the self, Foucault contrasts three paths for caring for 
oneself that arise in the ancient world. There is the Platonic path, exemplified in the 
dialogue Alcibiades, where Socrates advises the young Alcibiades to know himself in the 
sense of discovering or recalling who he is. There is the Hellenistic path, in which caring 
for oneself is a confrontation with and modification of which one is. And finally there is 
the Christian path, which asks one ultimately not to modify but to renounce oneself.  
In the second volume of the history of sexuality, Foucault turns his attention to 
the ancient Greek form that the care of the self takes. Here the framework is wider that 
that of the Platonic path described in the lectures. And yet it follows the lectures in its 
emphasis on three areas: dietetics, economics, and erotics. In the lectures, Foucault tells 
us, with regard to letters of Marcus Aurelius, “The body; the family circle and household; 
love. Dietetics, economics, and erotics. These are the three major domains in which the 
practice of the self is actualized in this period, with, as we see, constant cross-
referencing from one to the other”.102 
 Foucault offers a rich description of ancient writings concerning these three 
areas. Before turning to them, he introduces a term that does not appear in the lectures, 
but that frames the enquiry: problematization. Although he does not define the term, one 
can get a sense of it from the passage in which he introduces it: 
It is often the case that the moral solicitude is strong 
precisely where there is neither obligation or prohibition. In 
other words, the interdiction is one thing, the moral 
problematization is another. It seemed to me, therefore, that 
the question that ought to guide my inquiry was the 
following: how, why, and in what forms was sexuality 
constituted as a moral domain? Why this ethical concern that 
was so persistent despite its varying forms and intensity? 
Why this „problematization‟? 103 
 
What is a problematization then? Foucault contrasts problematizations with obligations, 
prohibitions and intersections. The latter three terms are familiar to us from their role in 
current moral thinking. We tend to consider the moral realm precisely as one of 
obligations and prohibitions. One might say that we think of the moral realm as divided 
into three areas the prohibited, the permitted and the required. There are, to be sure, 
gradations within them. However, much of the normative intervention into people‟s lives 
and behaviors does not fall under this simple rubric. If moral theory is a matter of sharp 
divisions, the practice of living is more often a matter of problematization. 
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 One can say that problematization occur in those areas of life that are considered 
problematic. For an area of life to be problematic is not for it to be a problem, as in a 
problem to be overcome. Rather, it is for that area of life to be fraught. Instead of 
prohibitions there are dangers. Instead of obligations there are opportunities. Instead of 
allowances there are multiple ways these dangers and opportunities can be navigated. 
Like our traditional conception of the moral realm, a problematic realm104is normally 
laden.  
 Foucault‟s earlier works have prepared us for this idea. And he tells us in the 
second volume: 
There was the problematization of madness and 
illness arising out of social and medical practices, and 
defining a certain pattern of “normalization”; a 
problematization of life, language, and labor in discursive 
practices that conformed to certain “epistemic” rules; and a 
problematization of crime and criminal behavior emerging 
from certain punitive practices conforming to a “disciplinary 
model.”105  
 
We must always be careful when Foucault reads his earlier works in light of his later 
projects. He often reinterprets what he has done in light of his current project. Here, 
however, the idea of problematization captures an aspect of the trajectory of his work. 
Foucault‟s work, whether archeological, genealogical, or ethical, has always been a 
matter of historical investigation of norms that determine that construction. 
 One might want to object here that the introduction of the idea of a 
problematization runs in conflict with the concept of power Foucault develops in his 
genealogical works. In Discipline and Punish, for instance, Foucault sees the operation 
of power undergoing a historical change. Before the eighteenth century, power operates 
on the model of the permitted and the forbidden. It is only in the last two hundred years 
that a more nuanced type of power emerges, one that can normalize or discipline 
subjects. By seeing problematization in an ahistorical fashion, by seeing it as something 
that concerns the ancients as well as the moderns, is Foucault abandoning this view of 
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power? Is he saying that power has always been positive and creative as well as 
negative and restrictive? 
 The situation may be even worse for Foucault. Not only that the introduction of 
the concept of problematization have removed power from history; it may even have 
inverted modern and pre-modern forms of power. Our current moral conception is 
dominated by obligations, permissions and prohibitions. Ancient morality, as Foucault 
stresses, is not. So it might seem that in fact the type of power associated with 
normalization and the disciplines is more properly seen in ancient practices than in 
modern ones. It is the moderns who operate by means of a repressive power while 
ancient practices create subjects through various problematization. 
 In replying to this objection, we must first distinguish our conception of morality 
from our practice of it. Regarding power, Foucault writes in the first volume of the history 
of sexuality that: 
One remains attached to a certain image of power-
law, of power-sovereignty, which was traced out by the 
theoreticians of right and the monarchic institution. It is this 
image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoretical 
privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power 
within the concrete within the concrete and historical 
framework of its operation.106 
 
The operation of power has changed, but our conception of it remains bound to the 
earlier models of its operation. The same is true for morality. Our practice of morality, as 
Foucault‟s problematization show, is more complex than just dividing it into three areas. 
This is why Foucault, particularly in his works from 1975 on, focuses on practices rather 
than on theories. 
 Another worry might arise here. Foucault argues that our conception of ourselves 
on the one hand and who we are on the other cannot be divorced. But in his view of 
power107 he seems to do the opposite. He says that our political and moral views do not 
reflect who we have come to be. Is there a problem here? I don‟t think there‟s a problem. 
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 And to my extension, it can also be his view on morality. 
For Foucault, our conception of who we are comes more from our practices than from 
political or philosophical theory. Who we are is a matter of our practices. Who 
intellectuals think we are is often a matter of theories that, although they are connected 
with certain practices in their own right, are often connected with practices that have less 
to do with who we are than with an intellectual legacy that has more weak relations to the 
practices that actually determine us. This does not mean that those theories are entirely 
divorced from who we are. What it means is that those theories have yet to grasp what is 
happening on the ground, a grasp that Foucault turns to genealogy108to achieve. 
 With this in mind, we can turn back to the initial worry that Foucault‟s introduction 
of the concept of problematization threatens to undo the historical character of his 
conception of power. In considering this objection, we must first distinguish 
problematization from power. They are not the same thing, although they are definitely 
related. Where problematization occurs, there is the possibility of power relationship, of 
actions constraining other actions. What do we make of the idea, then, embraced by 
Foucault during his genealogical period, that the operation of power is more negative 
and repressive in pre-modern Europe and more positive and creative in modern Europe? 
 There might be a glitch here in Foucault‟s thought. Problematization does open 
door to a power that creates subjectivity, but there are limits to its ability to do so that are 
bounded by the technology and social state of the times. For example, in order to 
monitor populations in the way that bio-power seeks to, there must be certain economic 
conditions in place, there must be concentrations of people, and there must be the ability 
to collect information across populations. Or again, in order to discipline a larger group of 
people, one must have the technology to monitor that group. What makes negative, 
repressive power more prominent in pre-modern societies is, perhaps, among other 
things, the inability to engage in certain forms of control that many types of creative 
power require. 
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 and then to ethics. 
 This does not mean that there is no creative power in ancient practice, a point 
that Foucault‟s later studies do not deny. For sure, Foucault does not consider power in 
his discussion of the care of the self. In an interview from 1984, Foucault has this 
exchange: 
Q: Thus there has been a sort of shift: these games of truth no longer 
involve a coercive practice, but a practice of self-formation of the 
subject. 
Foucault: That‟s right. It is one could call an ascetic practice, taking 
asceticism in a very general sense – in other words, not in the sense of 
morality of renunciation but as an exercise of the self on the self by 
which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a 
certain mode of being.109 
Foucault here makes a distinction. It is not that the “games of truth” involving the 
care of the self do not concern power. Instead, it is that power is not the focus of 
Foucault‟s analysis. There can be power in the way one is asked to care for oneself. 
Problematization can open up certain paths and discourage others: they involve actions 
upon actions that contribute to creating certain ways of being. However, the power that 
inheres in these practices and that does help create its subjects, may not have the same 
coercive force as the later forms of creative power that requires more technological 
advancement and different economic condition. 
 In the preface to the second volume of the history of sexuality, Foucault 
discusses the change in his approach from the one originally outlined in the first volume, 
he seems to see problematization as more closely entwined with power: 
To speak of sexuality as a historically singular experience also presupposed the 
availability of tools capable of analyzing the peculiar characteristics and interrelations of 
the three axes that constitute it: (1) the formation of sciences [saviors] that refer to it, (2) 
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the systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are 
able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of this sexuality.110 
The first two axes are, archeology and genealogy. The third axis is what requires 
a chronological re-orientation, because in order to accomplish it, Foucault believes he 
must “analyze the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on 
themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as subjects of 
desire”.111 
 Thinking of ethics, and with the issue of problematizations, as an axis that 
intersects with the axes of archeology and genealogy brings it in closer contact with 
power. This, in turn, allows that power, even creative power, can be an aspect of ancient 
forms of problematization. This is where there is, I think, a shift in Foucault‟s thought. It is 
where power as a creative and not merely repressive force can appear in ancient 
practices of living. But the shift is one of emphasis, not an overturning of a historical view 
of power. Foucault does not say that the creative power he describes in the genealogical 
works is non-existent in the pre-modern period. Rather, it emerges as the dominant form 
of power, the one most in need of analysis. By introducing the concept of 
problematization, by ascribing it a place in all his works, and by seeing it as an axis that 
intersects with power, he opens the door to a recognition that different types of creative 
power can occur in different time periods. Yet by the same token, he can also say that 
the more urgent forms of that power are the more recent ones, for economic, political, 
and technological reasons. 
 Foucault does not say any of this, because he does not address the problem. 
However, it is a perspective that allows us to see both the continuity and discontinuity of 
the later project with the earlier ones. 
 With this view of problematizations in hand, we can ask how the problematization 
that emerges among the ancients relative to sex occurs. As Foucault has emphasized, 
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sex in the ancient world is not yet what he would call sexuality. It does not yet stand as 
the secret key to open the mysteries of who one is, it is not the centerpiece of one‟s 
identity. Rather it is embedded in a larger ethical realm, the realm of the care of the self. 
What is this realm like? What makes something an ethical matter? If we are to 
understand the ancient care of the self, we need to know in general what ethical space 
looks like and then more specifically how the space is filled by ancient practices. 
 Foucault isolates four elements of the ethical: the ethical substance, the mode of 
subjection, the ethical work, and the telos. Together they form the framework of ethics, or 
more generally of any moral practice. On this view, moral theories of the type focus on 
obligations and prohibitions, would find their place within the larger realm of ethical 
problematization. 
 The ethical substance is “this or that part of himself [that the individual must 
determine] as the prime material of his moral conduct”.112Over the course of history, 
different ethical substances have been determined. For instance, many modern 
philosophers believe that behavior is the ethical substance. For others, like Kant, the 
ethical substance is the will. It need not be either of these, however. It can be the soul , 
or desire, or the emotions or passions. 
 The mode of subjection is “the way in which the individual establishes his relation 
to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it in practice”.113The ethical work is 
the work that „one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one‟s conduct into 
compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject 
of one‟s behavior”.114 If, in the mode of subjection, one establishes how the ethical has a 
hold on one, in the ethical work one realizes that hold through what one does.  
 The last element of the ethical framework is the telos. “[A]n action is not only 
moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also moral in its circumstantial integration and by 
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virtue of the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct”.115 The telos, we might say, is the 
point of moral conduct. As Foucault notes, in all these there are matters of conduct and 
practices of self-formation. Modern moral views tend to emphasize the conduct over the 
self-formation, while the ancients tend in the other direction. For instance, modern moral 
philosophers more often think of the ethical work in terms of what one does to 
accomplish moral goals than in terms of who one becomes by the conduct one engages 
in. In that way, there can arise the emphasis on the permitted and the forbidden that 
seems to many to be the heart of modern ethics. If Foucault‟s characterization of the 
ethical is right, however, that emphasis takes place within a larger framework of practice 
that has other elements that are formative of ethical subjects but that may not be 
theorized as clearly. Otherwise put, ethical practice may outrun ethical theory , just as 
certain modern practices of power lie beyond the theories of power meant to account for 
power‟s operation. 
 If this is the general shape of ethical space, or alternatively of the historical 
trajectory of ethical problematization, then we are prepared to ask what that shape looks 
like for the ancients. In particular, Foucault is concerned with the shape it bears upon 
sex. Sex is not in itself a separate problematic area in ancient living, an area with its own 
particular ethical problematization. Rather, it is part of the larger arena of pleasures, of 
aphrodisia. Foucault leaves the term aphrodisia untranslated; he uses it as a term of art. 
Broadly, it has to do with pleasures associated with certain types of activity. Not only sex, 
but also food, wine, and relations with boys are activities associated with aphrodisia. 
What all these activities have in common is that they involve an intense pleasure, one 
could that tempt a person toward excessive indulgence. Excessive indulgence, in turn, 
upsets the natural order of living. 
 For the Greeks, aphrodisiac pleasures are not morally suspect in themselves, as 
they will be later for Christian practitioners, but they are inferior. The activities from which 
these pleasures arise are not among the noble activities. Aphrodisiac pleasures have a 
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role in one‟s living, but it is a secondary role. The intensity of these pleasures, however, 
threatens to make them a primary focus on one‟s life. Although they are secondary in the 
proper order of living, they may become a primary focus of attention: 
It was just this acuteness of pleasure, together with 
the attraction it exerts on desire, that caused sexual activity 
to go beyond the limits that were set by nature when she 
mad the pleasure of aphrodisia an inferior, subordinate, and 
conditioned pleasure. Because of this intensity, people were 
induced to overturn the hierarchy, placing these appetites 
and their satisfaction uppermost. And giving them absolute 
power over the soul.116 
 
 How, then, is a person to approach the pleasures of aphrodisia, of which sex is 
an element rather than a whole? In Christian thought, the approach will be centered on 
renunciation. Aphrodisia will be associated with temptation and therefore with sin; the 
ethical relations to the pleasures of aphrodisia must then become one of abandonment, 
or, barring that, marginalization. One can see here the birth of a conflicted attitude 
toward sex, one that remains with us today: if sex involves a tainted pleasure, but is yet 
an unavoidable activity, then indulgence in it is at once necessary and indecent. 
Necessary because of procreation, indecent because of the inescapably impure pleasure 
it entails. The Greek attitude toward such pleasures is more measured. Renunciation is 
not the proper relation to them; rather, it is knowing how and when to indulge. 
 Foucault isolates three elements in the know-how of one‟s proper relation to 
aphrodisiac pleasures: need timelines and status. There is no shame in sex: there is 
however, a shame in overindulgence. One needs to engage moderately. One should be 
guided in one‟s sexual relations, as in one‟s culinary activity and one‟s consumption of 
wine, by need. Where the need is not urgent, one should refrain. That way, control 
remains with the subject of pleasures – the individual – and not with the pleasure 
themselves. Again, there are right and wrong times to engage in the activities that yield 
aphrodisia: times of day, times of the month, times of the year. Physicians in particular 
are concerned with understanding the proper rhythms of aphrodisiac indulgence. Finally, 
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there is a concern with the status of those who indulge that is most foreign to us now. 
Particularly in men‟s relation with boys, issues of class status of partners, the positions 
taken during sexual activity (active or passive), and the age of participants become 
matters of reflection in order to determine their proper levels and balance. 
 If moderation is the proper relation to aphrodisia, then the person who is capable 
of moderation is the person who can control his desires. One must become a master of 
oneself. “One could behave ethically only by adopting a combative attitude toward the 
pleasures…Thee forces could not be used in the moderate way that was fitting for them 
unless one was capable of opposing, resisting, and subduing them”.117This idea of 
mastery and particularly the image of battle against pleasures may sound Christian. It 
has a different inflection, though. In Christianity, one masters these pleasures because 
they are ultimately to be renounced. They are not to be controlled, but to be, in so far as 
possible, abandoned. As will later become the Christian approach the pleasures of 
aphrodisia are pleasures of the body. Since the body is immersed in sin, one must seek 
to overcome its pleasures to the extent that it is in one‟s power to do so. 
 None of this characterizes the Greek approach to mastery. The pleasures of 
aphrodisia may be fraught, they may be dangerous, but their dangers are not matters of 
sin. They are not irremediably indecent. Instead, the dangers of aphrodisia have to do 
with upsetting the natural order of pleasures and activities. Self-mastery does not require 
renunciation. Aphrodisia remains, but it remains under the control of the subject of its 
pleasures. Foucault refers to images used to describe this mastery, for instance Plato‟s 
image of the team of horses with its driver or Aristotle‟s discussion of the child in relation 
to the adult. It is not necessary to kill the horses or the child , but instead to ensure that 
they remain under one‟s direction and control. 
 What does this self-mastery yield? It yields a sort of freedom. Freedom is the 
goal of ethical relations to aphrodisia. This freedom is not, as we moderns may think, 
either freedom from deterministic forces or from political oppression. It is a freedom in 
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the self‟s relation to the self. “This individual freedom should not…be understood as the 
independence of a free will. Its polar opposite was not a natural determinism, nor was it 
the will of an all-powerful agency: it was enslavement – the enslavement of oneself by 
oneself”.118 As Foucault points out, this freedom is “virile” in character. It is active rather 
than passive, and involves power rather than the mere absence of coercion. 
 In this sense, the Greek approach to freedom and self-mastery brings together 
two qualities that often appear dissociated to us now: virility and moderation. We often 
think of virility as a matter of imposing one‟s will. The virile man bends others to his 
desire. Moderation, on the other hand, requires one to refrain rather than to impose. 
Combined in the same person, however, virility and moderation become a mastery of 
self, an imposing of one‟s will by means of moderating one‟s desires. This, in Foucault‟s 
view, is the Greek approach to ethics. 
 In this approach we can see the four elements of ethics Foucault cites. The 
ethical substance is aphrodisia. It is that part of the person that is the subject of ethical 
practice and reflection. The mode of subjection is the knowing-how associated with 
need, time and status. It forms what Foucault calls a type of savior-faire; instead of being 
a set of permissions and prohibitions, it form a sense of how to navigate among 
dangerous but not necessarily impure desires. The ethical work is the battle itself, the 
training, and effort required to bring the promised pleasures of aphrodisia under one‟s 
control. The telos is freedom. 
 Returning to the themes from the 1982 lectures, Foucault claims that the self-
mastery sought by the ancient Greeks is aligned with a particular from of truth. For Plato, 
for instance, in order to master oneself properly one has to know oneself, to recollect 
who one is. Again, we should not confuse the philosophical relation to truth here with the 
relation that has come down to us through which Foucault calls “the Cartesian moment”. 
It is not a matter of epistemology, of understanding the conditions of the subject‟s 
relation to knowledge. It is a practical relation, a relation to truth as one of the conditions 
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for a person to achieve freedom. The ancient relation to truth is subsumed under the 
larger project of the care of the self. It is not that the truth of things independent of 
oneself does not matter. Rather, it is that the truth matters in as much as it bears on 
one‟s relation to oneself. One of the current criticisms of contemporary philosophy is that 
it concerns itself with matters that are of interest only to the specialist; it is divorced from 
how we actually live. Not so ancient philosophy, in Foucault‟s view, since the project of 
ancient philosophy is nothing other than the articulation of proper ways to live. 
 In this relation to truth, Foucault discovers what he calls aesthetics of existence. 
He contrasts this to the hermeneutics of desire of later Christian practice: 
Now, while this relation to truth, constitutive of the 
modern subject , did not lead to a hermeneutics of desire, it 
did on the other hand opened to an aesthetics of existence. 
And what I mean by this is a way of life whose moral value 
did not depend either on one‟s being in conformity with a 
code of behavior, or on an effort of purification , but on 
certain formal principles in the use of pleasures, in the way 
one distributed them, in the limits one observed, in the 
hierarchy one respected.119 
 
We can recall the hermeneutic of the self from the first volume of the history of sexuality. 
There one learns to confess who one is, in order to learn one‟s nature. Central to this of 
course is the confession of one‟s sexual desire. In contrast, the truth of ancient thought is 
bound, not to a hermeneutics, not through an interpretation of who one is through a 
reading of one‟s desire, but to the project of learning how to live. 
 One might ask here whether the hermeneutics of desire that Foucault discovers 
in Christianity is to be found in its earlier versions. This would seem to be a revision of 
his view from the first volume, where he sees it arising in response to the Reformation. 
He does not address this issue, but I do not believe that a revision is necessary here. 
The confessional is, throughout its history, skewed towards even if not exactly a 
hermeneutics. Even if it is only a matter of saying what one does, those doings are still 
one‟s own.  To confess them is to put oneself before another in the context of the larger 
project of renunciation or purification. Later, when what is required is the confession of 
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desire, the hermeneutic character of the confessional becomes central. But the structure 
of the confessional is never far from a hermeneutics. 
 This confessional structure is distant from the ancient project that relates truth not 
to what one tells but to what one learns. As Foucault puts it in the 182 lectures: 
 Now the subject‟s obligation to tell the truth about 
himself…did not exist at all in Greek, Hellenistic, or Roman 
Antiquity. The person who is led to tell the truth through the 
master‟s discourse does not have to say the truth about 
himself. He does not even have to say the truth. And since 
he does not have to say the truth, he does not have to 
speak.120 
 
In the confessional, one tells the truth, in ancient practice, one learns it. 
 This learning takes place in four areas: dietetics, economics, erotics, and in 
relation to truth. Dietetics is not only about diet but concerns the general health regimen. 
A proper health regimen requires moderation and timeliness. Foucault suggests that 
there are two types of attention paid to dietetics, a “serial” vigilance and a 
“circumstantial” one. The serial vigilance concerns the order in which the activities are 
performed: “activities were not simply good nor bad in themselves; their value was 
determined in part by those that preceded them and those that 
followed”.121Circumstantial vigilance requires an awareness of the circumstances in 
which the activities is to take place: “the climate of course, the seasons, the hours of the 
day, the degree of humidity and dryness, of heat or cold, the winds, the characteristic 
features of a region, the layout of a city”.122 One must, in engaging in a proper health 
regimen, follow a reasonable order of activities. It is imperative not engage in exercise 
excessive or deficient exercise, sex, or eating; to be aware of where and when the 
aphrodisiac pleasures are to take place; and at all times to maintain control over oneself 
in any engagement.  
 If sex has a distinctive character in ancient dietetics, it is because it, more than 
other activities, is associated with violence, expenditure and death. The sexual act is a 
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violent one, involving a surge of spasmodic activity that threatens a person‟s self-
mastery. It also involves expenditure. Sex involves the imparting of life-giving forces; 
they are transferred from oneself to another, and thus entail an expenditure of one‟s own 
life forces. Finally there is in Greek thought an association of sex with death. Just as sex 
brings life is in recompense for lives that are passing away. In regard to the dietetics of 
sex, Foucault concludes that: 
The sexual act did not occasion anxiety because it 
was associated with evil but because it disturbed and 
threatened the individual‟s relation with himself and his 
integrity as an ethical subject in the making; if it is nor 
properly measured and distributed, it carried the threat of a 
breaking forth of involuntary forces, a lessening of energy, 
and death without honorable descendants.123 
 
 Economics in ancient thought concerns running of the household. For the 
ancients, of course, the man is the proper ruler of the household. This idea extends 
further among the Greeks to a lack of symmetry124 regarding household obligations. It is 
not just that there are different duties involved for the husband and wife. The nature of 
obligation is different. The woman is obliged to the husband, but the husband is obliged 
to himself. The project of the wife centers on fidelity, whereas for the husband it 
concerns self-mastery. Thus it is that if adultery is a wrong, it is not because a man 
betrayed his wife; rather, it is because a wife betrayed her husband and because another 
man has betrayed his civic duty toward that husband. In sum then: 
The husband is self-obligated in this respect, since 
the fact of being married commits him to a particular 
interplay of duties and demands in which his reputation, his 
relation to others, his prestige in the city, and his willingness 
to lead a fine and good existence are at stake125 
 
 Erotics is the most vexed of the aphrodisiac activities. This has to do in particular 
with the fact that it concerns love between men, and between men and adolescent boys. 
For Christianity, the problematization of sex is centered on the woman, but for the 
reasons just mentioned, the problematization among Greeks does not arise there. It 
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arises in the sexual relation between males. On the one hand, these relations are 
characterized by equality, since each of the partners is an equal citizen of the city. On 
the other hand, since the ethical requirement placed on each is one of an active self-
mastery, the issue of passivity becomes more urgent. The reason is that sex, for the 
ancient Greeks, is indissociable from penetration. The reason is that sex requires an 
active subject and a passive subject. To become penetrated is to become dominated, to 
be mastered instead of master. This in itself is dishonor, but the dishonor extends to 
questioning one‟s ability to govern oneself and even more generally to taking one‟s 
proper place in the governance of the city. “When one played the role of subordinate 
partner in the game of pleasure relations, one could not be truly dominant in the game of 
civic and political activity.126 
 This question becomes even more complex when the issue is one of sexual 
relations between men and adolescent boys. On the one hand, boys, like women, are 
objects of beauty, and can be appreciated and approached as such. On the other hand, 
boys are to become men, free citizens of the city-state. For a boy to allow himself to be 
dominated by another male is to imperil both his integrity and his reputation among 
fellow citizens. This seems to put the boy in a paradoxical situation neither acceptance 
nor refusal can operate without leaving an unseemly remainder. 
 We can begin to see here why, although the Greeks engage in rather than 
prohibit sex between men, their ethical problematization of this sex does not provide a 
contemporary model for Foucault. Not only, as he indicates, is there no possibility of a 
return to earlier models of living. In addition, there is an irresolvable contradiction that 
lies at the heart of this problematization, “namely, the difficulty caused, in this society that 
accepted sexual relations between men, by the juxtaposition of an ethos of male 
superiority and a conception of all sexual intercourse in terms of the schema of 
penetration and male domination”.127 
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 Foucault‟s treatment of the relation of sex and truth is more clipped, drawing from 
Plato and particularly from the Symposium. He suggests that the question of truth in 
regard to sexuality is one of true love. It arises in the relation between men and boys, 
since women are not considered as equals and so are unable to rise to the occasion of 
true love. For Plato, however, the question of true love is transformed, in Socrates‟ 
hands, into the question of the nature of love. It becomes a reflection on Eros. It 
becomes a reflection of Eros. This leads Socrates to endorse a love that is removed from 
physical relations between people and turns toward a love of higher things. This turn 
presages the later Christian privileging of renunciation, although it does so not as much 
through what it rejects as through what it seeks. 
 The third volume of the history of sexuality extends the themes of the second 
volume into the first centuries of our era. I will not follow this extension in detail here. In 
the 1982 lectures, Foucault offers a more detailed discussion of the care of the self in 
general. The third volume on sexuality focuses on the care of the self as it bears on sex, 
particularly in regard to health, marriage, and the relation to boys. Foucault summarizes 
the changes from the Greek approach to these matters: 
A mistrust of the pleasures, an emphasis on the 
consequences of their abuse for the body and the soul, a 
valorization of marriage and marital obligations, a 
disaffection with regard to the spiritual meanings imputed to 
the love of boys: a whole attitude of severity was manifested 
in the thinking of philosophers and physicians in the course 
of the first two centuries.128 
 
These changes may sound Christian, and indeed early Christianity draws from them. 
However, they appear in a Hellenistic context that inflects their meaning toward a form of 
self-cultivation rather than self-denial. 
          Foucault notes that these changes stem in good part from a different view of 
marriage and marital obligations on the one hand and a different political situation on the 
other.129 The transformation of the view of marriage is one in which the wife becomes a 
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more relevant factor, therefore beginning to shift the basis of love from that between 
males to that between a male and a female. Regarding politics, there are a number of 
modifications, including the complex bureaucratic institutions for governance that Rome 
develops. These replace the more personal democratic institutions of the Greek city-
state, and require changes not only in the public sphere but also in the economic sphere 
and the interpersonal one. 
 Foucault‟s last two volumes on the history of sexuality are published just before 
his death. They have been welcomed by many scholars of ancient thought, if for no other 
reason that it confer on ancient studies the cachet associated with Foucault‟s name. 
Because Foucault is not, as he openly admits, a scholar of ancient thought, one might 
ask after the accuracy of his interpretation of Greek and Hellenistic texts and the 
contexts in which they are written. 
 In Foucault‟s view, the care of the self provides the framework for the ancient‟s 
view of their relation to their lives. If, as the genealogical writings suggest, we often see 
ourselves in the lens of psychology, the ancients see themselves often through the lens 
of self-care. The ancients are no more – and just as important, no less – able to jettison 
their collective determination than we are. 
 This is not to deny that Foucault believes that there can be fruitful borrowing from 
the ancient framework for thinking about our lives. However, that borrowing will be in the 
service of living otherwise than we do now. And the project of living otherwise is never 
far from Foucault‟s writing. When he engages in genealogy, for instance, he does so with 
the goal of showing us that since who we are now is a product of a contingent history, 
living otherwise is always available to us. Perhaps, then, the difference between the 
ethics and the earlier works is that the ethical offer positive elements to be appropriated. 
It is not that Foucault has rediscovered the subject. The constitution of who we are, the 
construction of the subject, is always, for him, both collective and contingent. Rather, it is 
that the orientation of his writings is less overtly critical than it is of our more recent 
history. 
 These considerations also address another characteristic of Foucault‟s thought; 
that who we are is not just something we can shake off. This is as true of the ancients, 
with their care of the self, as it is of us. If, as we have seen, power operates differently in 
the ancient world, that is not because there is no power, but because the form it takes 
corresponds to the social, economic, and technological orientation and capacities of that 
time. Foucault does not argue that the ancient Greeks and Romans are freer than we are 
now. Nor does he argue that they are less free. When Foucault discusses freedom his 
concern is not the more and the less. The question of free will and determinism is not a 
touchstone of his thought. That we cannot easily shake off the determinations of our 
history is a central commitment of his thought. But that those determinations are 
contingent and therefore can be shaken off is a matter of free will or another form of 
determinism is a question that does not interest him. 
 The determination of ancient Greek and Roman lives is as complex in the ethical 
works as it is in the earlier studies. Who they are is not the result of a single overarching 
or underlying theme. It is the product of a network of interacting and practices and 
concerns. Those practices and concerns converge on problematizations that are difficult 
to navigate and sometimes, as in the case of the Greek male sex, paradoxical or 
contradictory. Moreover, the last two volumes of the history of sexuality are not 
discussions of Greek life per se, but rather a single thread in that life, the thread of sex.  
Foucault holds that thread to be of great moment in the fabric of ancient life. But he 
nowhere argues that ancient life can be understood solely by reference to sex or that of 
the problematizations of sex are the only problematizations in the ancient world. To the 
contrary: if we are to believe the lessons of the first volume, the attempt to make sex the 
pivot of understanding who one is, is precisely the project of normalization that Foucault 
wishes to overturn. 
 In the archeological works the question of complexity is a vexed one. To be sure, 
the archives of Foucault are complex. The rules and norms he discovers in them are 
elusive and difficult to isolate from the practices and texts he studies. On the other hand, 
the question of generality haunts his archeological writings. He seems uncertain about 
the extent to which the themes he unfolds are supposed to be characteristic of a larger 
social or cultural context. By contrast, the genealogical works are clearly limited in scope. 
Who we are is a product, not of a single set of themes, but of different intersections of 
diverse practices that follow a complex and contingent historical trajectory. Discipline is 
one theme, bio-power another.  
 The last two volumes of the history of sexuality, although they treat a single 
theme, do not betray the lesson of genealogy. They remain faithful to the idea that who 
we are is a product of complex history that cannot be reduced to a dominant theme or 
movement or process. 
 The intimacy of acting and knowing is on full display in the ethical works. If one is 
not careful, one might be tempted to say that the ethical works show a more intimate 
bond between action and knowledge than the earlier works. This would be a mistake, 
although there might be some grain of truth in it. Foucault‟s argument is not that the 
ancients have a deeper bond between their truths and their lives, but rather that they see 
themselves as having a deep bond. The philosophical truths with which the ancients are 
concerned contribute to the care of the self. Those who practice such a care are drawn 
to the truths that will assist them in that practice. 
 Compare this with the psychological truth characteristic of the disciplinary regime. 
On the one hand there is no formal project of self-care characteristics of the ancients, 
either in psychology or in philosophy. On the other hand, and more important, one sees 
who one is and how one should act in terms of the psychological truths that forms the 
epistemic frameworks of discipline. One may not see oneself constructing a life in the 
same way as the ancient Greeks; but one is concerned with being normal and 
conforming to the psychological concerns that preoccupy the carceral archipelago. As 
Foucault reminds us with the concept of poblematization , beyond the morality of duties 
and obligations there are always spheres of  behavior that are the object of scrutiny , 
ambivalence and uncertainty. It is not that the ancients face problematizations and we 
moderns do not. Rather it is that different problematizations face each.  
 There are many who see in Foucault, particularly in his genealogical works, a 
political fatalism. Everything is a matter of power the product of unforeseen forces 
insidiously determining who we are. There is no reason to struggle, and no point in 
struggling anyway, since we shall only wind up in another nexus of power. Among those 
who see Foucault‟s earlier works this way, there is often a sigh of relief that greets the 
appearance of the ethical works. After all, here we are faced with a subject that can 
create itself, make something of itself, rather than merely being a node in an evolving 
system of power. 
 However, there is no great divide between the earlier works and the later ones. 
Foucault nowhere argues that our lives are completely circumscribed by the archives he 
describes in the archeological works or the powers he recounts in the genealogical 
works. Conversely he nowhere claims that the care of the self is free from the constraints 
of the practices and norms of the time; quite the opposite. To ask whether Foucault sees 
us as having free will or as being completely determined by the contexts, rules, norms 
and powers he describes is to ask the wrong question. It is to impose the free will debate 
on a set of texts for which it is irrelevant. This is not to say that the debate itself is not 
important, or its results do not have an impact on how we see Foucault‟s works. Rather, 
it is to say that Foucault‟s writings cannot be read through the lens of that debate without 
distorting them. 
 What, then, are we to make of the idea of freedom? How does it apply to 
Foucault‟s work, if at all? There are two separate questions we might ask here. Only one 
of which I can answer. One question concerns the normative status of the term freedom. 
How does Foucault justify his criticism of disciplinary power or his embrace of the care of 
the self or an aesthetics of living as an exercise in freedom? What reasons can he give 
us for valuing the latter and not the former? Is it simply a matter of personal preference, 
and if not, why not? If certain forms of power must be abandoned and others not, how do 
we mark the difference between the two? These are difficult questions, ones that 
Foucault‟s writing do not address, except perhaps to invoke the term intolerable with 
regard to particular practices or power arrangements. They are questions I cannot 
address here without taking the discussion too far afield, but are certainly worth the 
asking. 
 The other question is, what does this freedom consist in? If it is not a matter of 
carving out a space of free will then what are we to make of the freedom Foucault‟s work 
seeks to offer? One hint for understanding it relies on returning to Foucault‟s reference in 
the preface of the second volume on sexuality to curiosity. Curiosity, in Foucault‟s sense, 
means straying afield of oneself. Freedom for Foucault lies in this straying of afield of 
who one is. But what is this straying? 
 Our history yields a particular complex of practices with their rules, norms, 
problematizations, knowledge and power arrangements. That is how we become who we 
are. Our practices are laden with politically, ethically and epistemically charged history 
that infuses us through the practices we engage in. What Foucault describes in different 
inflections in all his works are important moments and elements of that history. It is a 
history that is once constitutive and contingent: it makes us who we are, but not by 
necessity. If we understand our history, understand who we have come to be, and 
understand that we don’t have to be that then we are faced with the possibility of being 
something else. That is our freedom. 
 To be clear, to say that we can be something else is not to say that we can be 
anything else. We cannot simply choose who we are to be. The recognition of how we 
have come to be who we are does not eliminate the history that has brought us here. It 
does not eliminate the context in which we choose, nor the constraints that context 
imposes. Moreover, the complexity of our historical legacy allows us to question some 
areas of our lives, but not all of them at the same time. We may question aspects of who 
we have come to be, but we cannot step outside ourselves, leap from our own historical 
skin to choose our lives from some vantage point beyond the vagaries of our history and 
context. To stray afield of oneself is not to recreate oneself out of whole cloth. Rather, it 
is to experiment who one might be, to try other ways of being that may turn out to be 
more tolerable than who we are now. In Foucault‟s writings, and in his life, the theme of 
experimentation as an alternative to being who we are now is salient. To stray afield 
ourselves is precisely to experiment with who we might be. 
 To be free is to be able to experiment with who we are. It is to be able to make 
ourselves into something other than what we have come to be: to play with, to overturn, 
undercut, re-arrange, go beyond the legacy that we are. And to do this is mostly, if not 
always or completely, a collective project. Freedom occurs as a we, not as an I. It should 
be clear why this is. If our determination is collective, if who we are is a product of a 
history we share with others, then any form of experimentation is likely to place 
alongside others as well. It is difficult although perhaps not impossible, to imagine that a 
single person can succeed in straying afield of him/herself when the rest of the social 
field in which he/she is immersed remains unchanged. Even to engage in solitary 
activities –like writing or painting – is to respond to current social norms and 
expectations, if perhaps through rejecting them. And it is to imagine others who are 
willing to engage with one‟s own efforts either through reading or viewing or writing in 
turn. 
To experiment requires that there are others who are willing to experiment, that 
there is a we willing to jettison the intolerable for something that is perhaps better (or at 
least different from) The freedom to become who we might be is, like the history that 
brought us here, at once collective and contingent. As there is neither necessity nor 
individuality to our historical inheritance, so there is neither to our freedom. We face our 
possibilities as a darkly lit path, together with those who are willing to travel it with us. 
Clare O‟Farrell shares: 
In more specific terms, Foucault looks at how human beings 
order themselves and are ordered into historical entities 
known as subjects and how these subjects exercise their 
freedom by working on the limits of that order. This order and 
this work on the limits is at the same time both individual and 
collective.130 
 
The Filipino Identity 
Filipino-ness or the cultural identity of the Filipino are conventionally associated 
with the rhetoric of traditional politicians, nationalists and academics. The rhetoric on 
Filipino-ness assumes the existence of an essential Filipino belonging to a homogenous 
Filipino community, belonging to one Filipino nation. In contrast to the view of 
homogeneity, I suggest that Filipino-ness or the “feeling” and “knowledge “ that one 
belongs to a nation has been produced through representations, cultural practices like 
literature and the arts and even mass media. This alternative claim, that Filipino-ness is 
a product of culture assumes instead that concepts like identity are functional categories 
131 and not ontological categories. 
This means that identity is not a given; something that we acquire at birth. A 
Filipino‟s identity is determined by factors like province of origin, class location, religious 
affiliation, political ideology, age, education, sexual preference etc… Filipinos therefore 
occupy different subject-positions because of those multiple determinations. And yet 
these different types of Filipinos have been constructed to imagine themselves as 
sharing a common history and a common culture, as well as having common aspirations, 
and a common vision for the future. Such notions of homogeneity have been affected 
mainly though the State and it‟s ideological apparati or the hegemonic social institutions.  
A renowned Filipino academic, Dr. Leonardo Mercado132 has spent most of his 
academic life working on establishing a Filipino Philosophy.  But in order to do so, he 
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had to establish a Filipino identity first, to which he offered different methodologies in 
unearthing it. He anchored his formulation of identity by explicating the-world view on 
how the Filipino sees himself using metalingusitic analysis, phenomenology of behavior 
and value ranking.  
Mercado cited philosophers Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and the latter 
Wittsgenstein who have argued that language mirrored thought.133Hence particular 
languages have their unique ways of seeing reality. He suggests that we can infer from 
language through linguistic structures or from words or lexemes.134To illustrate he 
pointed out that the Philippine languages use plenty of prefixes, infixes, and suffixes. 
From a single Tagalog word can build around 700 variations.135This preference of 
focuses gives the mode to a sentence and modes prevail over tenses.136The preference 
of mode over tenses hints something about the Filipino‟s time orientation, which is non-
linear.  
Different philosophers have used the phenomenological method with variations. 
Mercado used phenomenology to see if there are patterns in Filipino behavior as applied 
to certain topics under focus. Once the pattern has been established and converge in 
their significance, Mercado draw some philosophical explanations to help understand the 
reason behind the said behavioral pattern. One of his favorite topics is the idea that the 
Filipino is not individualistic.137The Filipino is expected to have a companion. This is 
seen, for example, in the child rearing where the child is hardly ever left alone. Having 
companions is expected throughout life. Even hospitals with private wards in the 
Philippines have an extra bed for the companion of the patient. This group-mindedness 
also extends to being one with others in thinking. That is why the pilosopo, the person 
who thinks differently from others, is shunned. The Filipino also has mechanisms in 
making group alliances. One example is the compradazco system where the godparents 
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and their godchildren become quasi-relatives. Mercado has called the Filipino‟s group 
orientation a sakop mentality. Consequently even property is not individualistic but must 
be shared. A person who wins in a cockfight or in a lottery is expected to shell out a 
share of the wealth to others because property is communal.138 
Mercado cites Thomas Aquinas in saying that morality is based on human nature, 
consequently certain unique aspects human nature as shared by Filipinos warrant their 
interpretations of morality.139The opposing schools of thought in deontologism and 
consequentialism end up in a compromise of revisionist ethics. Mercado notes “It is 
focused not on individual acts, but on the totality of one‟s fundamental option. It honors 
the conscience of the people, which one must follow in honesty and truth140Judging 
moral issues depend on the value ranking of the people and has been applied to issues 
like justice, truth-telling, marriage and even the ecology.141 
There are two things I found lacking on Mercado‟s approach. First, although I 
agree with him in using cultural practices as a way of establishing a Filipino identity, he 
barely used history in investigating how these practices came about. It is important to 
investigate the inner layers and the nuances of the particular practice to better 
understand on how these practices contributed to the national psyche. Second, although 
Mercado made use of respectable and prominent philosophers, when placed in the 
postmodern debate, most of the theories he used won‟t hold ground. The alternative 
presented in this study focuses on how ideas, practices and the concept of self come 
about by looking through the lenses of archeology and genealogy. Furthermore, the 
study tries to find an argument that will survive the postmodern attacks on identity by 
borrowing important concepts and tools from a postmodern thinker. 
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Who Dictated Who? 
Philippine culture has always been a dynamic site for the dissemination of 
oppositional discourses against hegemonic notions of Filipino identity. The plurality and 
particularity of Philippine cultural practices, and the variegated experiences, issues, 
concerns, aspirations, visions of the different “communities” which they represent run 
counter to the claims of hegemonic culture regarding the supposedly unproblematic 
existence of the authentic Filipino and one large but homogenous nation moving towards 
a common goal. 
It would seem therefore that Philippine culture could serve as calculus of the 
diversity of Filipinos and Filipino communities. A study of the productions of these groups 
can demonstrate the differing subject-positions/varied life situations that constitute the 
Filipino and the likewise diverse histories/stories that can be told about the Philippine 
Nation.  
One can look at this phenomenon of plurality and particularization present in 
Philippine cultural practices and texts and resonated in other areas of Philippine social 
life as a sign of fragmentation. However, let me view this in a positive light. The 
recognition of the specificities of one‟s own community as well as acceptance of these 
differences by other Filipino communities are prerequisites for a construction of a 
negotiated unity amongst diverse communities and for the re-articulation of the broader 
construct of Filipino Identity or simply put of being a “Filipino”. This broadness of mind 
and spirit is needed to enable invisible communities to mark their spaces and make their 
contributions to the formation of a Filipino identity. 
We often talk about people as if they have particular attributes as 'things' inside 
themselves -- they have an identity, for example, and we believe that at the heart of a 
person there is a fixed and true identity or character (even if we're not sure that we know 
quite what that is, for a particular person). We assume that people have an inner 
essence -- qualities beneath the surface that determine who that person really 'is'. We 
also say that some people have (different levels of) power which means that they are 
more (or less) able to achieve what they want in their relationships with others, and 
society as a whole. 
Foucault rejected this view. For Foucault, people do not have a 'real' identity 
within themselves; that's just a way of talking about the self -- a discourse. An 'identity' is 
communicated to others in your interactions with them, but this is not a fixed thing within 
a person. It is a shifting temporary construction. People do not 'have' power implicitly; 
rather, power is a technique or action in which individuals can engage in. Power is not 
possessed; it is exercised. And where there is power, there is always also resistance.  
He described technologies of the self as ways individuals act upon themselves to 
produce particular modes of identity and sexuality. These 'technologies' include methods 
of self-contemplation, self-disclosure and self-discipline. Foucault also describes 
technologies of the self as the way in which individuals work their way into discourse. 
The colonial relation between Spain and the Philippines has been expressed in 
so many ways, the most controversial of which is: Without Spain there would be no 
Philippines. Such a statement would certainly arouse a lot of reactions. But does the 
statement actually have merit? 
As stated in the first chapter, I do adhere to the idea that without Spanish rule, 
there would indeed be no country called the Philippines. The name itself was given to the 
islands of Leyte and Samar142by Bernardo de la Torre of the Villalobos expedition in 
1543, to honor the Spain‟s crown prince Philip who later ascended the throne as Philip II. 
More importantly, it was Spain that imposed the same political structure on all the 
colonized tribes. Colonial policy implemented the same royal decrees, the Laws of the 
Indies, the Legal Code and the many orders and edicts, as well as the same system of 
taxation and forced labor on the natives. All colonized natives were baptized, wed and 
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buried in the same Catholic religion. Perhaps the most lasting and strongest imprint of 
the Philippines‟ colonization, the Catholic religion has led to the building of churches and 
convents and provided the inspiration for the visual arts, literature, music, dance and 
theater. 
The colonized people, collectively referred to as indios, all felt the effects of the 
encomienda system, the galleon trade, and later, the shift to an agricultural export 
economy, which gave birth to the same feudal relations everywhere in the islands. In 
their reduced state, regional groups in the colonized islands acquired a communality of 
institutions and experiences that became the basis for the shared community that was 
Filipinas. 
The formation of such communalities among the indios, however, should not elicit 
among contemporary Filipinos an attitude of servile gratitude, which unfortunately has 
characterized the reaction of not a few Filipino historians towards the Spanish period. 
Even the Catholic faith is not really something Filipinos should be grateful for, because it 
originally served as a willing and witting weapon of imperialism, more potent than the 
conquistador‟s swords and cannon, and because many of its missionaries, especially in 
the 19th century, violated the very spirit of Christianity with their lust and greed, causing 
sufferings among the colonized people, rich and poor alike. 
The fact is that Spain came to the Philippines and stayed in it for the economic 
benefits that “Mother” Spain could reap from the human and natural resources of the 
islands, and the institutions erected in the islands were primarily aimed at facilitating the 
realization of this goal. The cultural items or institutions introduced by the colonizer were 
later re-worked by the natives to their own benefit and interpretation. This is how the 
early Filipinos fashioned themselves. As Foucault argues there are other ways we can 
be, ways that can be explored through the construction of new practices. Who we are 
now is but historically contingent. 
Those who give Spain the sole credit, as “mother” to the Philippines tend to 
overlook that a two-fold movement brought about the birth of the Philippines. Spain‟s role 
in the creation of the colony comprises but half of the process of becoming Filipino; the 
other half represents the many and varied reactions of the natives to colonial rule. To put 
it simply, if Spain engendered the experiences that defined the indio, it was the natives 
themselves created movement that turned the indio into the Filipino. By looking at how 
Filipinos engaged the introduction of a new culture, and by using a Foucauldian view of 
history, Filipinos remained to be participatory subjects in constructing their identity. 
If the processed had stopped at the initial stage, the Philippines would have 
remained a colony. The rejection of the mother was the premise of nationhood. 
Furthermore the evolution of the Filipino culture had started long before and had already 
developed through centuries to the stage where the baby had to come out of the 
mother‟s womb. The culture that was born was the product of the planting of the 
Hispanic seed on the matrix of indigenous culture, which through a natural process of 
selection and rejection formed in its womb the culture that we now know as Filipino. 
Before the coming of Spain, the natives of these islands lived in barangays or 
villages that lined seashores or riverbanks or dotted hills or mountains. Governed by a 
strong man and a council of elders. The villages lived by fishing, planting rice and tubers, 
hunting, bartering goods, and raising animals for food. In this communal way of life, 
individual interest was subsumed to community welfare, and collectively characterized 
most activities. Because of tropical weather, houses were built on stilts and had steep 
roofs and many windows. Using materials plentiful in the natural environment, pottery, 
textiles, baskets, mats as well as tools and containers of metal or wood served the daily 
needs of the people.  
Rituals were held to ask the deities for a good harvest, victory in war, cure for 
sickness or epidemics, success in marriage or peace in death, among others. Usually 
found together, music, dance and theater drew motifs and materials from the 
environment and the activities of the tribe and were performed on festivities that 
celebrated the completion of stages in the lifecycle or the economic seasons. Oral 
literature sensitized natives to nature, gave guidelines for living, and ensured the political 
unity of the tribe. As a whole the arts were mainly functional, in harmony with the 
environment, and communal in orientation. It is this pre-colonial culture that served as 
womb for the formation of what would become the Filipino culture. 
The initial contact with Spain was traumatic for many natives because it was 
marked by the wholesale, deliberate, and violent destruction of the indigenous culture. 
Convinced that the native belief in anitos or ancestor spirits is the work of the devil, the 
friars ordered the mass burning of native icons, forbade the holding of animalistic rituals, 
and destroyed the writings on bamboo or palm leaf – almost completely obliterating the 
native way of life and racial memory. On the ashes of this native culture, the Spanish 
hoped to build their vision of a new society, mainly resembling theirs, in the tropics. 
The colonizers wasted no time in re-shaping the natives so they would fit in the 
hierarchical structure of the colonial government, where autocratic power flowed from the 
King and the governor-general to the humblest indio. The friars for their part, coopted the 
tagalog supreme god, Bathala, and reinterpreted him as the avenging god who ruled 
over a pyramid of saints and angels, the way the Pope and the church men held sway 
over the church. In the service of both majesties the native arts were reoriented and new 
forms were introduced, the better to communicate the new religion and culture to the 
indios. 
After destroying the evidence of the “pagan” culture, the Spaniards hoped that 
the entrance of the European religion and culture into the colony would be as easy as 
putting clothes into an empty chest. But they could not have been more wrong. The 
destruction of those material evidences did not necessarily lead to the eradication of the 
native culture itself. In fact, the object of Spanish persecution survived and prevailed as 
the functional culture among the Christianized natives. As host and mother culture, it is 
instinctively processed, the way any living organism does, the elements brought in by the 
colonizer. Native reactions to the alien intrusions included imitation, adoption, 
indigenization, assimilation, adaptation, and transformation. These processes seem to 
have occurred both singly and in combination with one or the other. In this picture, the 
Filipinos became partakers in crafting their national identity as they exercised power over 
that which was imposed. They turned the imposition into something uniquely theirs, 
successfully using power to create. 
The vigorous imposition of foreign models brought forth a generation of imitators 
or a phase of imitation among native artists. Many indios delighted in mimicking the 
Spanish in dress, manners, speech, and religion, so did the local artists copying 
estampitas and grabados given to them as models by the friars. Many products of 
imitations are understandably poor and second rate, because their creators were merely 
replicating lines and gestures with neither conviction nor integrity. Faced with the totally 
alien aesthetics of western culture, they tried to look or sound or move like the original 
but always fell short because their instincts were coming from another, much older, more 
visceral source. For artists, however who remain true to their self -imitation can become 
a necessary and fruitful period of apprenticeship before coming into their own. 
Once the native starts to make the foreign elements native or interprets them 
through local values, ideas or emotions, the native has started indigenization. With 
indigenization, the foreign element becomes intelligible to the natives leading the way for 
its acceptance. Such is the achievement of Gaspar Aquino de Belen in the Mahal na 
Passion of 1703, which interprets the Christ story within the culture of the native reader. 
Here, the narrator reprimands Judas for betraying Christ, and depicts his sinas a breach 
of a cherished native value – utang na loob – After the kindness shown by Mary to him, 
how could Judas bring himself to betray Mary‟s son. The emphasis here is not on greed 
or mercenary behavior; the central issue is the betrayal of trust and the refusal to 
reciprocate goodness shown by a person to another, a grave misconduct in the native 
vocabulary of interpersonal relations.143 
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Adoption implies taking the foreign element and using it for one‟s own. The best 
manifestation of which have transpired to the language and the itinerary forms 
introduced by Spain. In the 19th century language and literature were learned by the 
ilustrados who went to the colegios of Intramuros. Having mastered these, the ilustrados 
then used it not only in conversation with the Spaniards and fellow ilustrados, but more 
importantly in their struggle for reforms in Spain. The national hero, Jose Rizal, was 
influenced by Benito Perez Galdos and Alexander Dumas among others, wrote and 
published two of his most influential novels, Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not) 1887, and 
El Filibusterismo (Subversion) 1891, employed techniques of European type realism and 
romanticism in his graphic description of Philippine social types and realities. 
The process of assimilation selects details dismantled from the alien culture and 
incorporates these into the body of an indigenous form; in much the same way that food 
is digested and absorbed by the body. This process of merging diverse cultural elements 
favors the mother culture. The most prevalent examples of assimilation can be seen in 
the Filipinos‟ religious practices. In the atang-atang of the Ibanag, two female shamans 
in modern dress dance around the raft of offerings sanctifying it by singing Christian 
prayers to western-type guitar music in an ancient animistic ritual for curing the sick. The 
raft laden with offerings is later floated on the river as an offering to the sirena/o, a 
Hispanic name for river nymph. Similarly in the osana of Malolos Bulacan, farmers 
studiously collect all the flowers showered by little girls on the priest as they sing this 
“hossana” because these are believed to be effective in making rice grow if planted with 
rice seedlings. 
Adaptation implies changing, remodeling, reworking the foreign element so that it 
can conform to native circumstances or conditions. These conditions may be natural, like 
the tropical heat, the geographical location of the islands, the environment or human-
made like poverty and social movements. 
The Filipino culture has immensely adapted from the Spanish way of life.  The 
baro-saya-panuelo ensemble nof the mid 1850s aspired to but could only evoke the 
silhouette of the European crinoline ensemble. This is partly because of the tropical heat 
and the humidity of the islands making corsets and layers of petticoats unbearable, 
thereby modifying the thinness of the waist and the fullness of the gown. Similarly the 
geographical location of the Philippines in the earthquake belt has shaped the Philippine 
church in the style called “earthquake baroque.” Where medieval churches reach out for 
the heavens seeming to defy gravity, Philippine churches tend to be squat and earth-
bound, even when their style is gothic. Because the islands has its own flora and fauna 
and is what is known to the native artist, there was a widespread adaptation on 
European art. For example at the façade of the Church of Miag-ao, St. Christopher was 
depicted holding on to a palm tree as he crosses the river with the Christ child on his 
shoulder, with lush tropical vegetation on both sides. Spanish dishes like Paella, which 
uses chicken or rabbit, rice and saffron seasoning had to be adapted into the biringhe, 
which takes materials from the local environment, such as sticky rice, coconut milk and 
ange, a bark which colors the rice green.144 Another outstanding example would be the 
Bamboo Organ of Las Piñas. Because pipes of steel were difficult to import or repair, the 
Curate decided to make use of mature bamboos and incorporated them as pipes for the 
organ, creating an instrument unique to the Philippines and in the whole world. 
Although these processes may be isolated for the sake of discussion, they hardly 
ever existed by themselves, because in reality they became part of a country‟s dynamic 
cultural practices. Practices are what people live by. They determine who we are not by 
imposing a set of constraints from above, but through historically given norms through 
which we think and act. These historically given norms are neither divorceable from nor 
reducible to what people often consider to be their larger historical context. 
Concluding Remarks 
If who we are is a matter of our practices rather than of some human essence 
that determines us, then who we are is much more fluid and changeable than we are 
often taught. This is not to deny that the historical grip of our practices is a right one. On 
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the contrary, it is precisely the fact that our historical grip holds us so tightly that makes it 
seem to us that we cannot live otherwise than the way we do now, that we cannot be 
something other than what we are. However, if history is contingent, then its grip is not 
inescapable. How things are is not how they must be. By understanding our history we 
can intervene upon it. “My optimism”, Foucault says: 
“consists… in saying that so many things can be 
changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with 
circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than 
self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, 
historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological 
constraints… You know, to say that we are much more 
recent than we think… [is] to place at the disposal of the 
work that we can do on ourselves the greatest possible 
share of what is presented to us as inaccessible.”145 
 
 Circumstances rather than necessities; temporary constraints rather than 
anthropological ones, arbitrary rather than self-evident; fragile: that is the character of the 
historical trajectory that has brought us here. It has made us who we are not because it 
could not make us anything else. We can become otherwise. To do so, however, 
requires us to understand who we have been made to be and, more important, to 
recognize the historically contingent character of that making. Otherwise, who we might 
be, as opposed to who we are, will seem to us be inaccessible. 
 It is only a small step to see that to be otherwise than who we are can only rarely 
be an individual task. One does not act; one does not create oneself in a vacuum. If who 
I have been made to be inseparable from who we have been made to be, and if who we 
are is bound to the practices we engage in and that engage us, it is difficult to imagine 
how being otherwise can be accomplished without others. One does not create new 
practices on one‟s own. One does not alter the practices one participates in without it 
having effects on others. One does not understand one‟s own complex history without 
recourse to the work of those who also have attempted to understand theirs. If who we 
are is a collective project, then so is the project of being otherwise than who we are. 
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 The next question is, does Foucault‟s allow the idea of self-fashioning be used in 
a bigger scale, in this case establishing a collective identity? Eric Paras clearly and 
succinctly summarized Foucault‟s take on extending individual fashioning to a collective 
effort. Paras comments: 
“In Foucault‟s analysis of the Iranian events, as in nearly all of 
the work that he would undertake after 1978, the critical 
perspective was the reverse of what one had come to expect 
from him. Rather than starting from an immanent totality and 
demonstrating the ways in which the totality produced 
individual subjects as the result of its functioning, Foucault 
started from the standpoint of the individual. He treated 
subjects not as secondary manifestations of a more primary 
network, but rather as primary entities in themselves. It was 
not the functioning of power that made Iranians into the vital 
(and inflamed) subjects that they were; it was the 
accumulated behavior of Iranian subjects –desirous of 
effecting their own self-transformation-that stilled and then 
reconfigured the mechanisms of power. Within a year, 
Foucault would undertake to study this relationship for is own 
sake, examining in The Birth of Biopolitics the “liberal 
governmentality” in which outcomes were generated by the 
combined actions of individual actors, rather than by the 
desires of the center of the systematicity of the whole.”146 
 
 O‟Farrell supports this claim and says: 
As the individual is an integral part, indeed the product of his 
own society and history, the examination of that society and 
history can help him to understand what he is and where it is 
possible to change. Conversely the understanding of the way 
he is ordered and orders himself is essential if he is to try to 
produce effective change at an inter-individual or societal 
level.147 
 
These two passages supports the idea that Foucault‟s concept of fashioning 
one‟s self is necessarily extendable to be used in a societal level and that Foucault in his 
analysis of the Iranian events in 1979 hinted that he supports the possibility.  
What is certain is that the project of being otherwise is not inaccessible. We do 
not have to be who we are currently constituted to be. And in that sense we might refine 
the question that frames Foucault‟s work. Rather asking, “Who are we?” we might have 
Foucault asking the question, “Who are we now?” Although much of his historical work 
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describes a trajectory that precedes us, he often ends his books by drawing lessons from 
the character of our current ways of being. It is not that the question of who we are is the 
wrong one; it is rather that the question of who we are, if asked right, is the same as the 
question of who we are now. If we turn away from timeless or inescapable answers to 
the question of who we are, then unless we take as our task a mere historical curiosity 
about who we once were, the point of our doing history, the goal of this research, is to 
understand who we are now. 
 In an essay on Immanuel Kant, Foucault makes this clear. Responding to an 
essay of Kant‟s entitled “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault writes that what modernity 
offers us, and what much of the critical project of modernity has been, is a reflection on 
who we have been made to be and how we might escape the constraints of that making: 
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered 
not, certainly as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a 
permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must 
be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in 
which the critique of what we are is at one and the same 
time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and 
an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.148 
 
 Kant‟s text is a reflection of the enlightenment written by someone who is living 
through it. It is an attempt to grasp, to understand the present as it is happening. That, in 
Foucault‟s view, is a striking feature of the modern era and a legacy of the 
Enlightenment: it promotes a critical relation to one‟s present. Foucault writes: 
[T] he thread which may connect us with the 
Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements but, 
rather, the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is , of 
a philosophical ethos that could be described as a 
permanent critique of our historical era.149 
 
Foucault takes himself, like Kant to be inscribed in that ethos. In this sense, Foucault is 
not anti-modern; he is in his own eyes, precisely modern. He seeks to understand the 
present and who we have been made to be in that present, not to satisfy a passing 
curiosity but to open up the possibility for new ways of thinking. 
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 Foucault never does tell, aside from offering a few suggestive phrases, what 
these new ways of being should consist in. His task consists in asking about our present, 
asking who we have come to be in the present. But the task is not an idle one. Rather, 
“this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our impatience 
for liberty”.150 Near the end of his life, Foucault puts the point this way: 
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that in the 
eyes of some it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity – the 
only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth acting upon with a 
degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what 
it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free 
of oneself.151 
With Foucault, we must ask the question of who we are or who we are now. But 
this path will, in the end, prove useless unless there is the passion for who we might be. 
Foucault can reveal the contingency of who we have been told that we are, but he 
cannot inflame the desire to be otherwise. That must come, if indeed it does come, from 
those whose own lives are at stake. In this case the Filipino people. 
Identity is not clearly and unambiguously defined, rather it shifts over time and is 
generally considered unstable. In addition, it is primarily local circumstances and 
experiences of individuals, rather than larger structural conditions or positions and 
locations that are important in shaping these identities. This means that social classes, 
ethnic groups, or status groups may not exist in the manner described in traditional 
social theory, and analysis of these may not provide a useful way of understanding the 
contemporary social world. That is, the shared circumstances or common situations of 
class, race, or ethnicity may not exist, and may be purely a theoretical construct that 
theorists attempt to impose of the social world. Shared and common identities give way 
to shifting and localized identities that may or may not be shaped by the individual or in 
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this case as a people. The Filipino people through cultural practices and everyday living 
have continuously “fashioned” themselves by integrating the fragments of their post-
colonial past with colonial norms and dictates. Such actions is clearly in line with how 
O‟Farrell noted in her analysis of Foucault‟s concept of fashioning one‟s self: 
…to make of one‟s life an object of knowledge, to create a 
certain form of order, but an order whose limits must be 
constantly challenged . It is by no means an exercise 
reserved for a decadent few who wish to alleviate the deadly 
ennui of their existence. It is something that requires a good 
deal of thought, work and practice by every individual in 
relation to a variety of historical “mechanisms of truth” and to 
his or her own historical situation in the present, no matter 
how lowly or marginalized that situation might be. The 
modification of the self…produces a modification of one‟s 
activity in relation to others, and hence a modification in 
power relations, even if only at the micro level to begin 
with.152 
 
Furthermore, it is suffice to say that a fragmented, un-based and evolving Filipino 
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